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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Alonzo King was convicted of rape as a result of a match between 
crime scene DNA and a DNA sample taken at his arrest for an unrelated 
assault.1  In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld the law that 
authorized the collection of King’s DNA.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy emphasized the security-enhancing potential of DNA 
screening at arrest for even minor crimes: 
[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most 
devious and dangerous criminals.  Hours after the Oklahoma City 
bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who 
noticed he was driving without a license plate.  Police stopped serial 
killer Joel Rifkin for the same reason.  One of the terrorists involved in 
the September 11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just 
two days before hijacking Flight 93.2 
A vocal advocate of involving local law enforcement in federal 
immigration enforcement, Kris Kobach, similarly pointed out that several 
of the 9/11 terrorists had contacts with local law enforcement, after they 
had violated the conditions of their visas.3  Were police able to access 
databases that contained information about these individuals, they might 
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 1.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 
S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012)). 
 3.   Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local 
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALA. L. REV. 179, 188 (2005) (“Had the federal government 
possessed information regarding the hijackers’ immigration violations and possible terrorist 
connections, and had that information been distributed to police officers via the NCIC system, the 
terrorist plot that claimed nearly 3,000 lives might have been derailed.” (footnote omitted)). 
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have discovered that the individual they detained for a traffic violation 
was also a dangerous criminal or a deportable non-citizen.  With these 
discoveries, made possible by integrating disparate data sources, 
disasters would be averted, crimes solved, and the rule of law vindicated. 
The rise of increasingly encompassing and interoperable databases 
presents a tantalizing opportunity to combine criminal law enforcement 
with other public policy goals.4  These databases raise important 
questions regarding privacy and expanding government surveillance, 
which have attracted growing scholarly attention.5  Making these new 
tools available to state agents upon arrest also raises questions about their 
influence on the exercise of the arrest power.  Scholars have noted that 
access to such databases creates potential for police abuse of discretion, 
notably with regard to racial inequalities.6  This Article advances this 
discussion.  It situates the problems posed by on-arrest screening regimes 
in the broader context of the proper use and misuse of the discretionary 
authority to arrest.  It defines a category of improper influences on arrest 
decisions—“collateral incentives to arrest”—that are of particular 
concern.  And it identifies what precisely is objectionable about 
collateral incentives as a matter of normative legal principles and as a 
practical matter, using two illustrative on-arrest screening regimes, 
Secure Communities and DNA collection laws.  Under Secure 
Communities, fingerprints taken at arrest by any local law enforcement 
agency (LEA) are automatically screened against the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) database of known and potential 
immigration violators.7  Federal and state DNA collection laws provide 
for the involuntary collection of DNA samples from some arrestees, 
which are screened against databases containing DNA samples from 
arrestees and convicts as well as forensic samples from unsolved crime 
scenes. 
                                                          
 
 4.  See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 (2013) (exploring the 
rise of mass biometric databases and their expanding uses).  The FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) promises that due to its ongoing data gathering and processing efforts, “[t]he world’s 
largest repository of criminal fingerprints and history records is being searched in a flash by 
investigators and police professionals working to catch crooks and terrorists.” Criminal Justice 
Information Services, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 5.  See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 412–14 (2012); 
Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014). 
 6.  See, e.g., Kevin Lapp & Joy Radice, A Better Balancing: Reconsidering Pre-Conviction 
DNA Extraction from Federal Arrestees, 90 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 157, 166 n.62 (2012). 
 7.  See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
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Programs such as Secure Communities and laws such as those 
authorizing DNA collection on arrest offer collateral benefits—some 
desirable result beyond prosecution for the crime of arrest.  That is, an 
arrest by local LEAs anywhere in the country now carries with it the 
potential of promptly identifying and deporting immigration violators.  
And an arrest for a qualifying offense in most states now carries with it 
the potential to solve a cold case or deter a recidivist offender from 
future crimes for which DNA might be recovered.  Collateral benefits 
provide law enforcers with collateral incentives that are relevant to the 
discretionary decision to arrest particular individuals.  The incentives set 
up by these screening regimes are “collateral” because (i) they hold out 
benefits that are largely uncorrelated with the suspect’s probability of 
guilt for the crime of arrest, and (ii) the probability of reaping these 
benefits is largely independent of the suspect’s guilt of, or prosecution 
for, the crime of arrest.  To the extent law enforcers value the prospect of 
screening, the automatic availability of such makes arrests of some 
suspects more attractive than others, for reasons unconnected with their 
guilt, culpability, or the state’s interest in pursuing charges for the crime 
of arrest. 
This Article provides a framework that defines collateral incentives, 
distinguishes them from less distortive influences on arrest decisions, and 
generates expectations about their empirical effects on arrest patterns.  
Scholarly attention to the police use of discretion is, of course, not new; 
Stephanos Bibas, for instance, recently remarked that police discretion is 
not in itself a problem, but “unchecked, unreviewable, and potentially 
idiosyncratic discretion” is.8  In Part II, I explain in greater detail what 
makes incentives collateral and suggest that systematic incentives to 
exercise discretion in certain ways present a problem greater than 
idiosyncratic influences, arising from the inevitable variability in police 
officers’ preferences. 
Why are collateral incentives to arrest objectionable?  One might 
well think that the public interest is served by a more effective 
enforcement of the immigration laws and the identification of criminals 
who perpetrated unsolved crimes.  DHS officials emphasize that the 
program enables a more efficient detection of deportable non-citizens, 
but “does not in any way change local jurisdiction’s existing law 
                                                          
 
 8.  Stephanos Bibas, Bulk Misdemeanor Justice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 73, 75 (2013), 
http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/slideshow/Bibas-PS-Final-PDF.pdf. 
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enforcement or fingerprinting policies, procedures, or practices.”9  The 
assumption behind Secure Communities is “that LEAs continue to 
enforce the criminal law in exactly the same manner as they did before 
Secure Communities was activated.”10  The King majority similarly 
maintains that the benefits of DNA matching are obtained without 
changing law enforcement practices because “DNA collection is not 
subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might be ‘colored 
by their primary involvement in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.’”11  In short, the discourse surrounding these policy 
innovations tends to present arrests as useful tools that can be put to 
various social purposes at no additional cost.12  An obvious fact is elided 
in this exposition: the decision to arrest may be influenced by the 
officer’s awareness of the screening regimes and his assessment of the 
likelihood that the offender he is confronting is a dangerous recidivist or 
an immigration violator. 
Even if police were influenced by collateral incentives, what of it?  
The decision to arrest is, after all, discretionary.  Police have no general 
duty to arrest and may lawfully arrest anyone for just about any reason 
once probable cause is present.13  This article offers two interrelated 
reasons to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives.  The first 
reason, explored in Part III, is normative, based on a familiar principle 
that originated at common law but has survived into the modern era as 
the dominant standard to guide the discretionary decisions to arrest.  That 
principle—the “prosecution principle”—holds that police decisions to 
arrest ought to be guided by the interest in prosecution for the crime of 
arrest.  Collateral incentives, by definition, steer police away from that 
purpose.  Of course, police routinely arrest for a variety of reasons, and 
                                                          
 
 9. See ICE Office of the Director, Protecting the Homeland: ICE Response to the Task Force 
on Secure Communities Findings and Recommendations, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 11 (Apr. 27, 
2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-response-to-task-force-on-secure-communities 
.pdf [hereinafter DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.]; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): What are the 
benefits of Secured Communities?, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice 
.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 10.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 9, at 10–11. 
 11.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 
(1968)). 
 12.  See Ken Wallentine, Collection of DNA Upon Arrest: Expanding Investigative Frontiers, 
THE POLICE CHIEF (Jan. 2010), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm 
?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1982&issue_id=12010 (“DNA collection upon arrest will save 
lives, prevent violent crime by recidivists, save costly investigative resources, improve identification 
procedures, reduce misidentification, reduce convictions based on false confessions, and clear 
numerous cold cases.”). 
 13.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
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the prosecution principle does not demand legal sanctions to root out 
every other motive underlying arrests.  Nonetheless, systematic 
incentives to arrest for collateral benefits are in tension with the 
principled legal foundations of the arrest power—in particular, when 
they are created by means other than explicit state legislative expansion 
of that power. 
The second reason to resist the proliferation of collateral incentives, 
addressed in Part IV, is practical.  Collateral incentives are liable to 
affect arrest patterns in ways that differ from the effects of many other 
dubious influences.  Collateral incentives should be expected to have one 
or both of two effects: a redistributive effect on the pool of arrestees, 
including along ethno-racial lines, and an adverse effect on arrest quality.  
Critics of marrying immigration enforcement to local policing 
consistently allege that it leads to targeting of Hispanics.14  And courts 
and scholars express a similar concern about the impact of DNA 
collection.15  For a subset of arrests, as I demonstrate, collateral 
incentives are likely to result in both greater unwarranted inequality in 
arrest patterns and lower quality arrests.  Moreover, although the 
literature tends to worry most about undue influences on discretion with 
regard to high-discretion petty crimes, I offer reasons why we should 
also expect consequences with regard to serious crimes. 
II.   DEFINING COLLATERAL INCENTIVES 
The power to arrest is one of the most fundamental forms of the 
state’s power to coerce.  As recent controversies surrounding the police 
                                                          
 
 14.  E.g., Aarti Kohli et al., Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics 
and Due Process, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POL’Y (Oct. 2011), https:// 
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf; Secure Communities (“S-
Comm”), ACLU (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/immigration-enforce 
ment/secure-communities-s-comm. 
 15.  United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring) (noting 
“a substantial danger that law enforcement personnel will use the DNA-testing regime as a pretext 
for obtaining evidence against individual suspects”), vacated, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); People 
v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (cautioning that DNA collection “might 
provide an incentive to pretextually arrest a person from whom the police desire a DNA sample”), 
withdrawn, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011), and vacated, 302 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2013); Lapp & Radice, 
supra note 6, at 175 (warning that “DNA collection triggered by any arrest quickly leads to a DNA 
database of men of color.”); Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1586, 1589 
(2012) (warning that “[w]ith no limit on the pre-conviction collection of identity evidence, police 
will . . . be free to exponentially populate DNA databases.”); see also Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint 
Identification and the Criminal Justice System: Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA 
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 63–89 (David Lazer ed., 2004). 
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use of force in Ferguson, Missouri, and Staten Island, New York, remind 
us, this power to deprive individuals of their liberty is accompanied by 
the power to use force, including lethal force.16  The decision to exercise 
the power to arrest17 rests, to a large extent, within the discretion of the 
officer.18  Discretion in this realm means, among other things, that police 
may choose to arrest for relatively petty violations or select whom to 
arrest for arbitrary, unjustifiable reasons.  The Supreme Court and lower 
courts have long recognized this discretion, and the concomitant 
potential for its misuse,19 which is often explicitly tolerated.  For 
instance, in her dissent in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the case 
upholding police authority to make custodial warrantless arrests for fine-
only misdemeanors, Justice O’Connor underscored the “grave potential 
for abuse”20 created by the power to arrest anyone for common, petty 
violations.  The majority did not deny that abuses are possible, but 
explained that the appropriateness of a constitutional remedy depended, 
as Justice Souter put it, on “how bad the problem is out there.”21  So long 
as the abuses of discretion to arrest are kept within some acceptable 
levels, the Atwater majority intimated, these must be tolerated as 
unavoidable incidents of discretion. 
In Atwater, as in other cases, the Court pointed to constraints, legal 
and institutional, which function to contain the magnitude of “the 
problem” and channel police discretion towards legitimate purposes.22  
The key constraints on the abuse of discretion as well as unlawful arrests 
stem from the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement itself.23  
                                                          
 
 16.  See, e.g., Yoni Bashan, Comparing the Michael Brown and Eric Garner Cases, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/comparing-the-michael-brown-and-eric-
garner-cases-1416969202.  For an overview of the constitutionally permissible use of force in 
effecting an arrest, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 5.1(d) (5th ed. 2013). 
 17.  By arrests in this context, I mean “custodial arrests,” rather than a brief detention at the 
scene promptly followed by release.  See LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 5.1(a) (“In United States v. 
Robinson, the Court came up with the seemingly redundant phrase ‘custodial arrest’ to distinguish 
those arrests followed by release at the scene,” whether the latter are technically characterized as 
arrests or temporary seizures). 
 18.  See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (“the exercise of police authority 
[with regard to arrests, inter alia] calls for a very high degree of judgment and discretion”). 
 19.  Id. (“the abuse or misuse of [discretionary authority] can have serious impact on 
individuals.”). 
 20.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 21.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) 
(No. 99-1408). 
 22.  Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353. 
 23.  Id. at 352 (“So far as [warrantless misdemeanor] arrests might be thought to pose a threat to 
the probable-cause requirement, anyone arrested for a crime . . . is entitled to a magistrate’s review 
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Other constraints, which courts invoke when they decline to impose 
discretion-limiting rules on police, derive from other sources: the 
Supreme Court has pointed to the Equal Protection Clause as a safeguard 
against discriminatory enforcement;24 Justice Souter invoked “good 
sense” that the police themselves possess that it is in their own 
“interest . . . to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry costs that are 
simply too great to incur without good reason,” as well as “the political 
accountability . . . of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement 
officials.”25  Other courts have noted the prosecutorial screening 
function26 and civil suits.27  In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, where the Court 
declined to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to 
deportation proceedings, it did so in part in reliance on mechanisms of 
internal discipline: the INS “ha[d] its own comprehensive scheme for 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations.”28  The expectation is that, by 
and large, these constraints are sufficient to deter unlawful arrests, and to 
generally incentivize police to make arrests for the “right” reasons and 
on proper grounds.  Should these safeguards fail, however, some 
Supreme Court Justices expressed the inclination to reconsider decisions 
such as Atwater: as Justice Ginsburg noted, joined by three others, 
                                                          
 
of probable cause within 48 hours.”). 
 24.  E.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[t]he constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”); 
Holland v. City of Portland, 102 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[An] equal protection challenge to an 
arrest, despite probable cause existing, might yet be entertained . . . .” (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring) (“[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause has sufficient vitality to curb most of the abuses” that are unsanctioned by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 25.  Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352–53; see also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Utah 1994) 
(“Admittedly, police officers must decide which one of many traffic offenders to stop.  However, 
this decision is, for the most part, channeled by the desire of the police to apprehend the most serious 
offenders.”). 
 26.  E.g., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that bad 
intent on the part of the police is irrelevant, because “[i]t is the prosecutor’s intent that determines 
whether one who has been arrested on a warrant is prosecuted for that offense, not that of the 
police”); Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that “[t]he possibility of 
less than perfect investigative conduct on the part of the police” will be checked by the “prosecutor 
[who] has a duty to measure the facts in the report by legal standards and decide whether they add up 
to probable cause to prosecute”). 
 27.  Scopo, 19 F.3d at 786 (Newman, J., concurring) (“[o]fficers who misuse the authority we 
approve today may expect to be defendants in civil suits seeking substantial damages for 
discriminatory enforcement of the law.”). 
 28.  I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044–45 (1984); see also Eric J. Miller, 
Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 222–23 
(2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s faith in mechanisms of police self-regulation and 
professionalism in cases withdrawing the exclusionary rule for certain violations). 
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should “experience demonstrate[] ‘anything like an epidemic of 
unnecessary minor-offense arrests,’ I hope the Court will reconsider its 
recent precedent.”29  This Part elaborates the character of collateral 
incentives, and demonstrates that these safeguards should be expected to 
fail more often when police act on such incentives than if they act on 
other ulterior motives frequently discussed by scholars and courts. 
A.   The Arrest Calculus 
To appreciate the effects of collateral incentives on police exercise of 
discretion, it is useful to formalize a stylized cost-benefit arrest calculus.  
Police care about the number of arrests they make, a common measure of 
productivity.30  And police care about enforcement costs, including 
effort.  Beyond that, it is not easy to figure out what exactly the police 
are “maximizing” in making arrests.31  What can be said at a high level 
of generality is that officers seek to maximize “arrest value.”  That is, 
they seek to make the arrests of highest value to them at least cost.  What 
makes an arrest “valuable” to a particular officer is not wholly 
predictable, and as a result, there is little we can say about an optimal set 
of arrests for each officer.32  There is, however, something we can say 
                                                          
 
 29.   Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings, but 
noting that the Court’s “conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there 
developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were 
widespread.”). 
 30.  There is ample evidence that arrests are treated as one measure of productivity by LEAs.  
See e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 595–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal 
dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013) (presenting evidence that police felt pressure to “increase arrests” based 
on a 2008 survey of NYPD retirees, and reviewing other evidence of supervisors directing officers to 
meet numerical enforcement goals “backed by the threat of negative consequences”); Justin Fenton, 
Baltimore Officer Pleads Guilty to Armed Drug Conspiracy, BALT. SUN (Mar. 11, 2013, 8:42 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-police-officer-plea-richburg-
20130311,0,6845283.story#ixzz2amOISgV3 (explaining that the illegal actions of a Baltimore 
police officer were driven by the need “[t]o rack up arrests and look good for his bosses”); Justin 
Peters, Do Arrest Quotas Encourage Police Officers to Break the Law?, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2013, 9:00 
AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/03/15/kendell_richburg_baltimore_police_do_arrest_ 
quotas_encourage_cops_to_break.html (reviewing several public scandals surrounding alleged arrest 
quotas). 
 31.  Daniel Richman makes this point with regard to prosecutors: “I can only throw up my 
hands and beg the reader’s indulgence for my failure to figure out precisely what prosecutors or 
agents seek to maximize.  Convictions?  Sentence-years?  Deterrence? Agency prestige?  Lifetime 
earnings?  Leisure?  My provisional assumption is that every prosecutor . . . is impelled by a broad 
variety of motives . . . .”  Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 749, 758 (2003). 
 32.  Even within a single unit, what makes arrests valuable likely differs among individual 
officers.  See, e.g., PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN 
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about arrest decisions for any one offense or a class of comparable 
offenses. 
The value police derive from making an arrest can be disaggregated 
into two components, the “intrinsic” and the “extrinsic.”  I posit here that 
the “intrinsic” value of the arrest hinges on the possibility of prosecution 
of the arrestee on the basis of conduct that prompted the arrest.  Part III 
defends this proposition at greater length; for the time being, it is just a 
presumption about the core interests served by arrests.  In this regard, 
police may derive some benefit from the fact of making a lawful arrest.  
They may derive a further benefit from a fruitful arrest, or an arrest that 
in fact leads to prosecution and a possible conviction.  The expected 
intrinsic value of any arrest is the sum of the benefit of a lawful arrest, 
discounted by the probability that probable cause is lacking, and the 
benefit of a fruitful arrest, discounted by the probability of non-
prosecution.33  It is reasonable to assume that the intrinsic benefits of 
arrest are the same across suspects for the same offense or class of 
violations.34  The quality of the arrest is a function of its evidentiary 
basis, and dismissal by the magistrate or non-prosecution are quality-
based constraints on police arrest decisions.35  Insofar as police care 
                                                          
 
DISTRICT 136–45 (2008) (describing heterogeneity in arrest behaviors among officers, describing 
some officers in a squad as “high-arrest officers” and others as “low-arrest officers,” and reporting 
that some officers intentionally make no arrests for a particular set of offenses). 
 33.  There is evidence that police care about prosecution to some extent, and are thus responsive 
to prosecutorial screening.  See, e.g., George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, in ROUGH JUSTICE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 127 (John A. Robertson ed., 1974) (noting that 
“rejection of too many cases can have serious repercussions affecting the morale, discipline, and 
workload of the force”); Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to-
prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the Bronx District Attorney’s 
new policy to interview every officer making trespass arrests, and declining to automatically 
prosecute, with the result that trespass arrests had fallen by a third).  Police departments’ internal 
rules may also impose costs on police officers if the D.A. rejects the charges sought by the officer, 
for example, Houston Police Dep’t General Order 500-7 (requiring the officer to give details and 
explain D.A.’s reasons for rejecting officer’s attempt to file charges, and providing for supervisory 
review when “the charges are rejected because of alleged mishandling by an officer”). 
 34.  As noted, little can be said about the relative intrinsic value of arrests across different 
offenses or offense types. 
 35.  Low quality of arrests is a major reason for non-prosecution.  See PETER GREENWOOD ET 
AL., PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 66–68 (1973) (finding that insufficiency of evidence is a leading reason for rejection 
of felony charges); Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: 
An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1459 tbl.10 (2004) 
(finding that in 22% of cases, prosecutors give the weakness of evidence as the reason, and in 
another 8% that no crime was committed); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 805 (2012) (“If an officer accumulates accusations of dishonesty or bias that 
would have to be disclosed, prosecutors will sometimes pressure his police chief to reassign him 
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about the lawfulness and the fruitfulness of an arrest, they will seek to 
make higher quality arrests. 
Police may also derive some extrinsic benefit from making an arrest, 
which is anything perceived as a benefit beyond that of a lawful or 
fruitful arrest.  Such a benefit may arise from external incentives, such as 
a rule that pays a premium to officers for every arrest.  It may also arise 
purely from internal motives, such as the satisfaction an officer might 
feel from arresting a personal enemy.  The expected extrinsic value of 
any given arrest is the probability that its extrinsic benefit materializes, 
discounted by the probability that the officer suffers some sanction for 
the arrest, such as a civil suit or a disciplinary action related to the 
unlawful arrest. 
The total expected value of an arrest is the sum of its intrinsic and 
extrinsic components, further discounted by the probability that the arrest 
will lead to some legal challenge, such as on the basis of equal protection 
or state racial profiling laws.36  One may justifiably conclude that civil 
suits for constitutional violations, whether on the basis of unlawful 
arrests or on equal protection grounds, are infrequent,37 while constraints 
internal to the criminal justice system—i.e., no-probable cause 
determinations, non-prosecutions, and departmental discipline—are more 
common, and are thus more energetic constraints on police activity.38  
                                                          
 
rather than have him work cases in which he could become a key trial witness . . . [C]hiefs often 
comply and move the officer to a less appealing administrative assignment.”). 
 36.  Because sanctions based on these bases may apply even to lawful (legally sufficient) and 
fruitful arrests, as well as legally insufficient arrests, it is the total value derived from an arrest that is 
diminished by this prospect. 
 37.  The Equal Protection Clause (EPC) does not constrain as much as it might, due to the high 
burden of proof on the plaintiff.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (“The 
claimant must demonstrate that the . . . policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose.’” (citation omitted)).  Claims that the EPC places no meaningful limits 
on criminal enforcement discretion have long been commonplace.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Givelber, The 
Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. 
ILL. L. FORUM 88, 90 (1973) (“[J]udicial application of the equal protection clause in this area is 
grudging. Present doctrine affords neither relief to those claiming to be the victims of abusive 
selective enforcement nor control over selective enforcement decisions.”); David A. Harris, 
“Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic 
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 551–52 (1997) (explaining why equal protection offers 
little redress for unequal policing).  Claims that civil suits for unlawful searches and seizures are 
ineffective are likewise common.  See, e.g., David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in A 
Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 659, 691–96 (2007). 
 38.  For evidence that internal discipline, based in particular on Early Intervention Systems 
(EIS), affects officers’ conduct, see SAMUEL S. WALKER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EARLY 
WARNING SYSTEMS: RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM POLICE OFFICER (2001), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf.  On the importance of departmental discretion 
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Thus, I focus the discussion on the constraints that are internal to the 
criminal justice system, rather than the (lesser) possibility of legal 
challenges. 
Plainly, police officers make decisions to arrest for many extrinsic 
benefits unconnected with the prospects of actually prosecuting the 
arrestee for the crime of arrest.  Not all of these reasons are equally 
problematic.  The extrinsic benefit of an arrest may or may not be (i) 
correlated with39 or (ii) legally and institutionally dependent on the 
quality of arrest.  Collateral incentives to arrest exist when the realization 
of extrinsic benefits is both uncorrelated with and legally and 
institutionally independent of the quality of arrests.  To say that a benefit 
is legally independent means that no rule of law deprives the police of 
the benefit if an arrest is unlawful.  Institutional independence, in turn, 
refers to the independence of the benefit from internal disciplinary 
sanctions for unlawful or fruitless arrests.  The likelihood of a 
disciplinary sanction depends on, among other things, whether the LEA 
shares the extrinsic benefit influencing officers to make arrests.  In this 
light, external incentives may be contrasted with subjective, idiosyncratic 
motives: as a general matter, officers acting on incentives created by 
rules or institutions applicable to all should be disciplined less often than 
officers acting on idiosyncratic motives.  By contrast, some extrinsic 
benefits may be described as merely “ulterior,” rather than wholly 
collateral, because to reap those benefits police must still be attentive to 
arrest quality due to correlation of the benefit with guilt, or legal or 
institutional dependence. 
B.   Immigration and DNA Screening as Collateral Incentives 
As suggested, the immigration and DNA screening regimes create 
extrinsic benefits, which affect law enforcers’ arrest incentives.  Secure 
Communities is not the first innovation that automates detection of 
immigration violators or links federal law enforcement to local criminal 
law enforcement, and the concerns about collateral incentives raised here 
apply to some extent to certain earlier programs, as well as some 
                                                          
 
generally, see Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 
(2011); Jeffrey S. Nowacki, Organizational-Level Police Discretion: An Application for Police Use 
of Lethal Force, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Nov. 2011; Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational 
Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004). 
 39.  To be more precise, correlation in this context is between signals of guilt of the crime of 
arrest and signals that the extrinsic benefit is likely to materialize. 
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initiatives by localities to obtain immigration information from DHS.40  
But, the Secure Communities program is the last and most 
comprehensive step in the federal government’s automation of 
immigration screening.  The DHS operates IDENT, a database which 
contains biometric data on a variety of known and potential immigration 
violators.41  Fingerprints taken by law enforcement agencies are routinely 
transmitted to the FBI for a criminal background check.42  Between 2008 
and 2013, Secure Communities linked IDENT to FBI’s IAFIS in every 
U.S. county, allowing these fingerprints to be checked against IDENT as 
well.  A fingerprint match leads immigration officials to investigate 
further.43  If immigration officials decide to initiate deportation 
proceedings against the arrestee, historically, a detainer is issued to the 
LEA requesting that the suspect be detained for up to 48 hours for the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to assume custody.44  
Local law enforcers may perceive the program to deliver a benefit in one 
of two ways: screening may identify individuals who will in fact be 
placed in deportation proceedings by ICE, thereby removing immigration 
violators from the jurisdiction irrespective of charges against them; and, 
in the case of individuals who otherwise would be charged, held, and 
                                                          
 
 40.  For an overview of evolving use of immigration databases, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration 
Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1105, 1131–34 (2013); for an overview of local initiatives to detect immigration violators, see 
Monica W. Varsanyi et al., A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the 
United States, 34 L. & POL’Y 146 (2011). 
 41.  Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of the Inspector General, Communication Regarding 
Participation in Secure Communities, OIG-12-66 (Revised), 3 nn.2–3 (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-66_Jun14.pdf.  For a more detailed explanation 
of how records are entered into the database, see Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 11–15 (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendi
xj_jan2013.pdf. 
 42.  FBI’s IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System) database has been 
operational since 1999.  Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI, http://www. 
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 43.  Officers of the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) further investigate the 
individual’s immigration status; LESC’s response is then forwarded to the relevant ICE field office, 
and routed back to the arresting LEA.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Secure Communities, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 44.  A detainer is a request by immigration officers to hold the individual.  See KEVIN R. 
JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 84 (2009).  As part of recent policy changes, 
DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed ICE to replace detainers “with requests for notification (i.e., 
requests that state or local law enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that 
person is otherwise in custody under state or local authority).”  Jeh Johnson, Secure Communities, 1, 
2 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_ 
memo_secure_ communities.pdf. 
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possibly incarcerated by the local authorities, the prospect of deportation 
potentially saves local law enforcement resources.  Although in 
connection with President Obama’s executive action on immigration in 
late 2014, DHS announced that Secure Communities is to be 
“discontinued,” the transmission of fingerprints, screening, and the 
potential for deportation of some immigration violators remain in place.45 
The centerpiece of the DNA screening regimes is CODIS, which 
contains over 10 million DNA profiles, collected by local, state and 
federal law enforcement officials during criminal investigations (the 
forensic profiles) and from individuals arrested for or convicted of 
crimes.46  The federal government and 30 states have enacted laws 
providing for involuntary DNA collection from individuals arrested for 
some crimes, requiring no warrant or additional justification.47  After a 
digital profile of the arrestee’s DNA sample is created, it is added to the 
DNA database and analyzed for matches to existing profiles.  In fifteen 
states, DNA collection is limited to serious felonies; in nine states, 
collection encompasses all felonies; and in eight states, it extends also to 
certain misdemeanors.48  Calls for expanding coverage to more crimes 
are common.49 
The following sections illustrate that the realization of benefits 
promised by the immigration and some, if not all, DNA screening 
regimes are largely uncorrelated with and independent of the quality of 
arrests, and demonstrate how collateral incentives differ from some 
                                                          
 
 45. Johnson Memo, supra note 44, at 1.  By directing ICE to “discontinue” Secure 
Communities, Secretary Johnson meant that ICE should not seek deportation of every non-citizen 
identified, but to follow existing enforcement priorities, which focus on individuals with prior 
criminal convictions. See also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals: 
Patterns & Demographics, n.1 http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics#ft2 (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).  
If the changes are implemented, this means that local police cannot expect that every deportable non-
citizen would in fact be deported, but that expectation remains reasonable for a considerable subset. 
  46.  In the federal database, 1,922,415 samples were arrestee DNA profiles and 565,159 were 
forensic profiles as of July 2014.  See CODIS–NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 47.  See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, DNA Arrestee Laws (2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [hereinafter NCSL]. 
 48.  See id.; Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 270 
NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 18, 20 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238484.pdf. 
 49.  See, e.g., House Research Org., Texas House of Representatives, Should Texas Expand Its 
DNA Arrestee Database?, FOCUS REPORT, Mar. 24, 2014, http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ 
focus/DNA83-8.pdf (discussing proposed bills in Texas to broaden DNA collection on arrest for 
misdemeanors); Jaime Adame, Will Okla. Authorities Collect DNA from the Accused?, OKLA. 
WATCH (Dec. 21, 2013), http://oklahomawatch.org/2013/12/21/will-okla-authorities-collect-dna-
from-the-accused/ (discussing proposed bill in Oklahoma to broaden DNA collection on arrest for all 
felonies and some misdemeanors). 
570 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
merely ulterior considerations that influence the exercise of arrest 
discretion. 
1.   Non-correlation 
Consider the familiar notion of “statistical discrimination,” which 
entails using group traits as one basis for selecting targets for 
enforcement on account of perceived disparities in offending between 
identifiable groups.50  The practice is a particularly controversial one 
when the groups are ethno-racially defined, but the relevant group trait 
need not be ethnicity or race: age and gender, for instance, are major 
predictors of criminal offending, and police routinely focus on young 
males for this reason.51 Statistical discrimination would lead an officer to 
focus on a person suspected of crime A because he is a member of the 
group thought to have higher offense rates for that same crime A.52  One 
may justifiably harbor a number of serious misgivings about statistical 
discrimination; however, if statistical discrimination is based on an 
accurate assessment of differential offending, it leads police to focus on 
suspects statistically more likely to be guilty of the crime of arrest. 
a. Immigration Screening 
Now compare statistical discrimination to profiling on the basis of 
the extrinsic benefit created by on-arrest immigration screening—the 
                                                          
 
 50.  See, e.g., John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and 
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 205 (2001). 
 51.  Objections to statistical discrimination are many: profiling on any group traits is 
controversial, inter alia, because it is in tension with individualized suspicion, and profiling on the 
basis of race burdens innocent members of the profiled group disproportionately.  See, e.g., Albert 
W. Altschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 167 (2002); David 
Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice 
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1082–83 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and 
Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? 8 (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 
4822009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474809.  For the 
present purposes, I imply nothing about the justifiability of the practice, but employ it solely as a 
contrast to the operation of collateral incentives. 
 52.  For a formal treatment of disparities in arrest rates due to differential perceived rates of 
offending, see Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: Police Discretion and Racial 
Differences in Dismissals of Felony Charges, AM. L. & ECON. REV. 110 (2008); see also Harcourt, 
supra note 51, at 17–18 (explaining that selecting on differential offense propensity should lead to 
the overrepresentation of the higher-offending group in the arrestee population relative to the 
group’s offending rate, and that this overrepresentation becomes worse overtime if police “then 
rel[y] on the evidence of the resulting correctional traces—arrests, convictions, supervisions—in 
order to reallocate future law enforcement resources”). 
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identification of a deportable person and a high chance of their 
deportation.  Insofar as we have good empirical evidence, the probability 
of an individual’s deportability is generally uncorrelated with arrest 
quality.  The emerging scholarly consensus is that immigrants, whether 
authorized or not, are less prone to crime than natives.53  That 
generalization does not apply across the board: notably, it is not the case 
for criminal violations of immigration laws themselves, or a few offenses 
to which the undocumented are peculiarly susceptible, such as document 
fraud or unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle when eligibility for 
drivers’ licenses is restricted.  However, for the vast majority of crimes, 
immigrant status as the signal of deportability is uncorrelated with the 
signal of criminality, and most crimes of arrest for the undocumented 
will be for crimes that are unrelated to criminal immigration law 
violations.54 
Sometimes police can identify a suspect as foreign-born, a 
reasonable indicator for non-citizens.  Often police cannot directly 
                                                          
 
 53.  See Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Matthew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in 1 CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 2000—THE NATURE OF CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 485, 496 (Gary LaFree et al. 
eds., 2000), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps5244/Vol.%201/02j.pdf (“[Th]e major finding of a 
century of research on immigration and crime is that . . . immigrants nearly always exhibit lower 
crime rates than native groups.”); Rubén G. Rumbaut, Undocumented Immigration and Rates of 
Crime and Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical Realities, IDEAS IN AM. POLICING, April 
2009, at 126 (finding that “the lowest incarceration rates among Latin American immigrants are seen 
for the least educated groups, who are also the groups who account for the majority of the 
undocumented: the Salvadorans[,] Guatemalans [], and the Mexicans”); Robert J. Sampson, Op-Ed., 
Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2006), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/03/11/opinion/11sampson.html (describing results of his study that revealed that Latin 
American immigrants are less violent and less likely than the second and third generations to commit 
crimes even when they live in dense communities with high rates of poverty); see also Laura J. 
Hickman and Marika J. Suttorp, Are Deportable Aliens A Unique Threat to Public Safety? 
Comparing the Recidivism of Deportable and Nondeportable Aliens, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
59 (2008).  A growing body of social-science literature also indicates that higher concentrations of 
immigrants do not correlate with higher crime rates.  See, e.g., John M. MacDonald et al., The 
Effects of Immigrant Concentration on Changes in Neighborhood Crime Rates, 29 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 191 (2013); Jacob I. Stowell et al., Immigration and the Recent Violent Crime Drop 
in the United States: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas, 47 
CRIMINOLOGY 889 (2009). 
 54.  While DHS did not collect systematic data on crimes of arrest under Secure Communities, 
it did collect that data for about 44% of those removed as a result of Secure Communities during 
fiscal year 2011 and the first half of 2012: 37% of arrests were for traffic offenses, 12% were 
“dangerous drug” offenses, 10% were various assault offenses, and 40% were “other” offenses, a 
category that includes many common crimes such as larceny, burglary, fraud, obstructing the police, 
weapon offenses, robbery, and smuggling.  In sum, a typical arrest that ultimately resulted in a 
deportation was for a range of crimes, most of which are unrelated to those to which the 
undocumented are particularly susceptible.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 22–24 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-708. 
572 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
identify all foreign-born, and the indicator most commonly cited as 
employed by police seeking deportable immigrants under current 
demographic conditions is Hispanic or Latino ethnicity.  Focusing on 
Hispanic ethnicity alone is also not likely to be an informative signal of 
guilt for many crimes in many jurisdictions. 
Hispanic involvement in crime has been understudied due to a 
historic dearth of ethnicity data.55  Insofar as ethnicity data has become 
available, it shows that incarceration rates, and certain arrest rates, for 
Hispanics have become higher than those of Whites over the past two 
decades, but lower than those of Blacks.56  However, more systematic 
research suggests that for many crime categories, the inference that 
Hispanic involvement in crime is higher than that of White non-
Hispanics is unwarranted.  Incarceration statistics overstate Hispanic 
offending for a combination of reasons: first, as criminologists caution in 
general, disparities in official statistics “may reflect biases in the way 
criminal justice institutions treat different racial and ethnic groups rather 
than differences in actual offending.”57  Beyond that, the growing 
population of undocumented immigrants leads to an underestimate of the 
Hispanic population in the numerator, thus overestimating rates;58 
second, the most crime-prone group—young males—is larger in the 
Hispanic than non-Hispanic population, which assures higher offense 
                                                          
 
 55.  Fewer data sources report Hispanic ethnicity than race.  See Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Racial 
and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Delinquency in the United States, in ETHNICITY AND CAUSAL 
MECHANISMS 139–40 (Michael Rutter and Marta Tienda eds., 2005). 
 56.  See, e.g., Jacob I. Stowell et al., Latino Crime and Latinos in the Criminal Justice System: 
Trends, Policy Implications, and Future Research Initiatives, 4 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 31, 32 (2012). 
 57.  R. Richard Sampson et al., Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Violence, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 224, 224 (2005); Robert J. Sampson & J.L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, in ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND 
IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, CRIME AND JUSTICE 324 (M. 
Tonry ed., 1997) (“Findings based on official data such as arrest statistics published by the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) are limited to the extent that apprehended offenders differ in some 
way from nonapprehended offenders (e.g., because of racial bias).”); Morenoff, supra note 55, at 
149 (the “major criticism of official records is that they confound differences in the likelihood of 
arrest and conviction that may result from bias in the criminal justice system”).  Importantly, 
because immigration prosecutions have come to occupy a large share of federal criminal cases, the 
incarcerated Latino population has increased considerably, giving a not entirely accurate impression 
that Latinos are more crime prone.  See Stowell et al., supra note 56, at 34 (arguing that for these 
reasons, “it is somewhat premature to conclude that this is suggestive of the fact that Latinos have a 
higher propensity to engage in criminal violence”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier et al.,  Reassessing Trends in Black Violent Crime, 1980–
2008: Sorting out the “Hispanic effect” in Uniform Crime Reports Arrests, National Crime 
Victimization Survey Offender Estimates, and U.S. Prisoner Counts, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 197,  208–09 
n.5 (2011). 
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rates;59 and finally, there is evidence that Hispanic defendants are more 
likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and for longer sentences 
compared to other groups, which assures Hispanic overrepresentation 
among the incarcerated.60  Studies that draw on sources beyond raw 
official data almost uniformly find that Hispanic involvement in violent 
crime is lower than Black involvement, while the comparison to White 
rates is more complex.  Some evidence suggests that Hispanic violence 
falls “(somewhere) between White and Black levels,”61 and other 
evidence suggests that Hispanic violence is lower or comparable to 
White levels.62  Hispanic involvement in violent crime, moreover, differs 
considerably across national origins: there is evidence that Mexican 
Americans, for instance, exhibit lower rates of violence than White 
Americans, whereas Puerto Ricans exhibit higher rates.63  Because the 
national origins of the Hispanic population differ considerably across the 
country, the dominant Hispanic population in many jurisdictions would 
be no more predisposed towards violent offending than non-Hispanic 
Whites.  With regard to other crime categories, there is evidence that 
overall illicit drug use among Hispanic youths is not very different from 
that of Whites,64 and for Hispanic immigrants specifically, drug use is 
                                                          
 
 59.  Id. 
 60. E.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’ Sentencing 
Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 161 (2001) (finding that in 
Pennsylvania courts, “White defendants are treated most leniently,” and “Hispanic defendants are 
treated most harshly” with regard to decisions to incarcerate and sentence length, controlling for a 
host of factors including criminal history and offense levels); Andrew Golub et al., The 
Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 131, 149 (2007) (finding that in New York City, “Black (10%) and Hispanic (10%) 
[marijuana in public view] arrestees were much more likely to be sentenced to time served [in jail] 
than White (4%) MPV arrestees”). 
 61.  Steffensmeier et al., supra note 58, at 201 (citing studies). 
 62.  Sampson et al., supra note 57, at 224 (finding that the odds of violence were 85% higher 
for Blacks compared to Whites, whereas Latino violence was 10% lower); Darrell Steffensmeier et 
al., Scope and Conceptual Issues in Testing the Race-Crime Invariance Thesis: Black, White, and 
Hispanic Comparisons, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1133, 1154 (2010) (showing that Hispanic rates of arrest 
for homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, and robbery are nominally higher than for Whites, 
and concluding that rates are “comparable”).  There is evidence that concentrations of Latinos at the 
aggregate level are associated with lower levels of crime rates for certain crimes.  See, e.g., Stowell 
et al., supra note 53, at 31 (finding that “the concentration of Latinos tends to be associated with 
lower levels of homicide victimization”). 
 63.  Sampson, supra note 57; see also Toya Like-Haislip, Racial and Ethnic Patterns in 
Criminality and Victimization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND 
IMMIGRATION 107, 122 (2013) (reviewing studies). 
 64.  Lloyd D. Johnston et al., Demographic Subgroup Trends for Various Licit and Illicit 
Drugs, 1975–2009, MONITORING THE FUTURE OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 7 (2010), 
http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/occpapers/occ73.pdf. 
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lower than for other demographic groups.65  Less is known about 
ethnicity disparities for less serious offending, but there is no good 
evidence to support a general conclusion that Hispanics are more likely 
to offend than all other ethnic groups.  In sum, for many crimes, arrests 
influenced by the prospective arrestees’ likely deportability will lead 
police to focus on suspects who are not more likely to be guilty of the 
crime of arrest compared to members of other demographic groups. 
b. DNA Collection 
Whether the interest in obtaining a DNA sample leads police to focus 
on suspects based on features that do not correlate with guilt of the crime 
of arrest is a more complex question.  The interests commonly said to be 
served by DNA collection go beyond the interest in identification of the 
individual and his criminal history emphasized by the Supreme Court in 
Maryland v. King.66  DNA collection and analysis also provides the 
extrinsic benefit of solving unsolved crimes by means of matches (“cold 
hits”) between the arrestee’s DNA profile and that collected at an 
unsolved crime scene.67  Importantly, DNA collection also serves simply 
to insert DNA profiles into the database, so as to deter and detect any 
further crimes by the DNA donor.68 
                                                          
 
 65.  Charles M. Katz et al., Assessing the Relationship Between Immigration Status and Drug 
Use, 28 JUST. Q. 541, 560 (2010) (finding that (Hispanic) illegal immigrants in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, were “significantly less likely to use marijuana, methamphetamine, or any illicit drug when 
compared to US citizens”); Enrico A. Marcelli, An Estimate of the Level and Determinants of Illicit 
Drug Use Among Unauthorized Latino Immigrant Arrestees in California, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 487, 
503 (2001) (finding that unauthorized Latino immigrant arrestees in California were less likely to 
use drugs than citizens). 
 66.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013). 
 67.  A “cold hit” in the DNA database is a more likely event than a fingerprint match to prints 
lifted from a crime scene.  See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012).  Studies 
suggest that adding arrestee profiles to CODIS likely increases the number of “hits” and aids more 
investigations, although the true effect of additional arrestee profiles is obscured by the fact that 
many such profiles would have been added after conviction.  See Julie E. Samuels et al., Collecting 
DNA at Arrest: Policies, Practices, and Implications, THE URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR. 51 
(2013), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412831-Collecting-DNA-at-Arrest-Policies-Practices-
and-Implications-Report.pdf; Matthies Goulka et al., Toward a Comparison of DNA Profiling and 
Databases in the United States and England, RAND CORP. (2010), http://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR918.pdf. 
 68.  See, e.g., Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1064 (“The mere existence of the DNA database creates a 
strong deterrent effect. . . . [I]t is much easier for a criminal to cover his fingerprints than it is to 
prevent any DNA from being left at a crime scene.  A felony arrestee is less likely to commit another 
crime in the future if he knows that his DNA is catalogued in the State database.” (citations 
omitted)).  The DNA expunction laws in principle diminish the value of the latter interest to the 
police; however, as noted above, placing the burden of expungement on the arrestees ensures that 
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To think about the correlation issue, I borrow the terms Kaye and 
Smith use: “target” crimes are those for which “biological trace evidence 
might be found” and retained in databases, and “collection” crimes are 
those that trigger DNA collection on arrest.69  The incentives created by 
DNA collection would not be fully collateral if signals of guilt for target 
crimes were correlated with signals of guilt for collection crimes.  
Whether such a correlation exists depends on what set of crimes trigger 
DNA collection,70 and on what police treat as a signal of guilt of the 
target crimes.  A few considerations ought to create serious doubts about 
the relevant correlation. 
Prior offenders are more likely to commit additional crimes than 
people who have never offended, and prior arrests are a strong predictor 
of future arrests.71  These regularities might suggest that, all else being 
equal, a person who is (accurately) believed to have committed crimes in 
the past is more likely to be guilty of another crime than a person who 
has no criminal past.  If so, then police arresting suspected prior 
offenders because they hope to collect and match their DNA for some 
target crime may be statistically justifiable, a practice of statistical 
discrimination.  This is, however, misleading: a criminal with particular 
criminal experience may not be more likely to commit a specific crime 
than either other criminals, or non-criminals. 
Consider a case in which both the collection and target crime consist 
of rape only.  Faced with two otherwise indistinguishable suspects, if 
police were to arrest the one with a prior rape history, they would be 
acting on a signal correlated with guilt of the new rape.  However, 
matters become more complicated when the set of “collection” crimes is 
expanded: for example, suppose the target crime is still rape only, but 
collection crimes now include robbery, car theft, and gambling.  A 
suspected rapist may be more likely to commit another rape, but he is not 
                                                          
 
many profiles remain.  Paradoxically, the possibility that a profile has been expunged may create 
incentives to repeatedly arrest the same suspects for DNA collection, since collection at one point 
does not guarantee that the profile remains in the database. 
 69.  D. H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and 
the Case for Population-wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 420 (2003). 
 70.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance in the Life Course, 18 
ANN. REV. SOC. 63, 69 (1992) (“There is ample evidence that antisocial behavior is relatively stable 
across stages of the life course.”); Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners 
Released in 1994, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REPORT, NCJ 193427 10 (June 2002), 
http://www.aci-adc.com/images/Recidivism/RecidivismofPrisonersReleased1994.pdf (“The number 
of times a prisoner has been arrested in the past is a good predictor of whether that prisoner will 
continue to commit crimes after being released.”). 
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more likely to commit robbery, car theft, or gambling than someone with 
a different criminal history.  Research finds that a degree of 
“specialization” exists for many common serious offenses.72  The rapist 
may still be more likely than a non-offender to commit one of these 
crimes, because there is some positive cross-correlation among different 
crimes.  And for some crimes, serious prior offenders do not appear to 
have a statistical advantage: as the Bureau of Justice Statistics finds, 
convicts whose crimes warranted a prison sentence––i.e., the kinds of 
serious crimes for which traceable DNA evidence is likely to exist––are 
rearrested “almost exclusively for a felony or a serious misdemeanor.”73  
Yet, as more crimes qualify for collection, the correlation between the 
relatively static set of target crimes and the expanding set of collection 
crimes inevitably becomes weaker.  And the incentives created by DNA 
collection do not lead police to focus only on suspected rapists when 
investigating rape or related crimes; they are, instead, incentives to focus 
on suspected criminals when contemplating arrest for any crime 
triggering DNA collection.74 
Thus far, it has been assumed that police have a well-founded belief, 
though not based on legally sufficient evidence, that a specific person 
they arrest for a collection crime is also guilty of a target crime.  It seems 
just as likely, if not more likely, that police may be influenced by the 
availability of DNA collection even in the absence of such a unique 
suspect.  Suspects identified through CODIS have considerably longer 
criminal histories than suspects identified through other means.75  If 
police were to attempt to distinguish among suspects on the basis of their 
likelihood to turn up in CODIS one way or another, they would logically 
opt for the usual suspects, viewed as most likely to commit crimes 
repeatedly.  The usual suspects, as many justifiably worry, are more 
                                                          
 
 72. That is, a robber is more likely than others to commit robberies, which means a rapist is less 
likely than the robber to do so.  For a quantification of specialization, see Langan & Levin, supra 
note 71. 
 73.  Id. at 1. 
 74.  The relevant correlation is likely to become weaker as repeat offenders cycle through the 
system.  The only group police would find useful to target is criminals who have either not been 
arrested post-collection law or had their samples expunged, but are nevertheless suspected of being 
uncaught repeat offenders. 
 75.  In one study of 500 crime scenes, “[s]uspects identified using DNA evidence had 
substantially more serious criminal histories than those identified through traditional investigation.  
Suspects identified by DNA averaged 2.9 prior felony convictions and 5.6 prior felony arrests, 
compared with 0.9 prior felony convictions and 1.7 prior felony arrests for suspects identified using 
traditional investigation in the control group.”  John K. Roman et al., The DNA Field Experiment: 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the Use of DNA in the Investigation of High-Volume Crimes, THE 
URBAN INST. 4 (Apr. 2008). 
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often than not characterized in racial and class terms.76  Thus, the worries 
expressed by experts that “DNA collection triggered by any arrest 
quickly leads to a DNA database of men of color,”77 one that “reflects 
the race, class, and geographic biases embedded in police and judicial 
practices.”78 
Aside from the problem of race- and class-based inequalities, is there 
reason to think that selecting suspects on this basis correlates with arrest 
quality for any given collection crime?  The extent to which race (or any 
comparable, broad social trait) correlates with repeat offending differs 
across crimes.  As Sampson and Lauritsen note in their review of 
criminological studies, “there are certain offenses for which each [race] 
is overrepresented.  For instance, Whites are disproportionately arrested 
for driving while intoxicated, and Asians are over-represented in arrests 
for illegal gambling.  Blacks are consistently more likely to be arrested 
for crimes of violence,”79 and as Morenoff adds, Blacks are 
underrepresented in other liquor law violations.80  Most studies on 
offense rates and reoffending are based on official statistics, which are 
likely to reflect existing law enforcement biases.81  Nonetheless, even 
with such biases, there are differences across crime types.  Studies based 
on sources other than official data also show that Black youths are less 
likely to use drugs compared to other groups.82  In general, Black-White 
race disparities are greatest for violent crimes, and are less pronounced or 
absent for other crimes.83 
As noted, target crimes for which crime scene samples are data-
banked are predominantly serious violent crimes.  Collection crimes, 
however, are considerably broader in many jurisdictions, with initiatives 
to broaden them further afoot.84  Profiling on race because of its 
perceived correlation with serious violent criminal offending may 
                                                          
 
 76.  See Charis E. Kubrin & Eric A. Stewart, Predicting Who Reoffends: The Neglected Role of 
the Neighborhood Context in Recidivism Studies, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 165, 166 (2006) (reviewing the 
empirical literature finding that minority offenders are more likely to recidivate). 
 77.  Lapp & Radice, supra note 6, at 175. 
 78.  Cole, supra note 15. 
 79.  See Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 57, at 311, 325. 
 80.  Morenoff, supra note 55, at 148. 
 81.  See supra note 57. 
 82.  Johnston et al., supra note 64, at 7. 
 83.  Id.; Like-Haislip, supra note 63, at 126 (while it is “reasonable to conclude that minorities, 
particularly African Americans and American Indians, are disproportionately often serious crime . . . 
offenders[,] [r]acial and ethnic variations are less pronounced for other crimes, such as illicit drug 
use and delinquent behavior”). 
 84.  See supra note 49. 
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correlate with the probability of guilt of other violent crimes, but not 
with the probability of guilt for other collection crimes.85  Thus, as the set 
of collection crimes becomes broader, indicia of general suspicion of 
recurring criminality become less informative for more and more arrests.  
Since there are more arrests for minor than serious crimes, the incentives 
created by DNA collection laws, in jurisdictions where misdemeanors or 
all felonies trigger collection, are largely collateral.86 
The consequences of these incentives are likely to resemble, in some 
respects, those of one familiar modern policing strategy.  Frank Zimring 
describes the problem of “two-stage selection” in the context of 
aggressive street police tactics such as “hot spot” policing in New York 
City.87  As Zimring explains, “the street patrol officer is concentrating on 
potential robbers and burglars when selectively enforcing marijuana 
laws,” and thus, “will select ‘the usual suspects’ not for pot but for street 
crimes more concentrated among minorities.”88  By the best estimates, 
the rates of marijuana violations are not significantly different across 
races.89  And marijuana arrests under this policing strategy became 
distinctly racially skewed.90  As there is little evidence that robbers or 
burglars are more likely to be guilty of marijuana crimes than other 
people, hot spot policing involved police in a pursuit of an extrinsic 
benefit that was likely uncorrelated with the guilt for the crimes of arrest. 
                                                          
 
 85.  Some studies also found that minority offenders are more likely to specialize in an offense, 
which further suggests that profiling on one target crime is not an informative signal of guilt for 
different types of collection crimes.  See Todd A. Armstrong & Chester L. Britt, The Effect of 
Offender Characteristics on Offense Specialization and Escalation, 21 JUST. Q. 843, 862 (2004) 
(finding “that non-white offenders may show a relatively greater likelihood, when compared to white 
offenders, to specialize in a variety of offenses”); Christopher J. Sullivan, et al., Rethinking the 
“Norm” of Offender Generality: Investigating Specialization in the Short-Term, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 
199, 210 (2006) (summarizing studies of distinctions in specialization patterns across race). 
 86.  It is important to note that even limiting collection to felonies includes a very broad set of 
crimes.  See, e.g., Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Maryland 
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207) (“California, for example, seizes and searches the 
DNA of everyone arrested for any felony, including crimes such as stealing $250 worth of fruits or 
nuts from a farmer’s field, unlawfully subleasing a car, or simple drug possession.  The federal 
government takes DNA from persons arrested even for minor misdemeanors . . . .”). 
 87.  FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE 123 (2012). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See, e.g., Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New 
Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 606 (2010) (citing 
evidence of comparable rates of marijuana use across races); Like-Haislip, supra note 63, at 118–20 
(reviewing multiple studies based on two major national surveys, which consistently show lower 
rates of use of most illicit drugs by Black teenagers than by White teenagers). 
 90. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing 
and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
165 (2007); Golub et al., supra note 60. 
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2.   Legal Independence of Arrest Quality 
Even if the likelihood of realizing an extrinsic benefit is uncorrelated 
with the likelihood of prosecution for the crime of arrest, a legal 
dependence of the former on the latter would discipline officers into 
making lawful arrests.  In the case of marijuana arrests noted above, 
police are selecting arrestees on a basis not likely correlated with guilt.  
But if their goal is incapacitating supposed dangerous criminals, police 
have incentives to ensure that the arrests are at least lawful and maybe 
even prosecutable.  To take another example, scholars and commentators 
have long criticized the search incident to lawful arrest (SILA) doctrine 
on the grounds that it encourages pretext arrests.91  The possible 
discovery of evidence of a (usually more serious) crime for which police 
lack a sufficient quantum of suspicion is an extrinsic benefit of making 
an arrest for a (usually minor) crime.  Even if suspicion as to the more 
serious crime is a worthless signal of guilt of the crime of arrest, the 
police must still care about the lawfulness of the arrest to avoid the 
exclusion of any discovered evidence.  While these extrinsic benefits—
incapacitating dangerous offenders and discovery of evidence, 
respectively—may not be correlated with the guilt of the crime of arrest, 
they are still legally dependent on the quality of arrest. 
While the relevant law is evolving, extrinsic benefits created by the 
immigration and at least some DNA screening regimes are largely legally 
independent of arrest quality.  As Wayne Logan documents, information 
discovered as a result of screening has been treated as “identity 
evidence,” a species subject to different rules from ordinary evidence.92  
Thus, at present, it is uncertain that even an illegal arrest would imperil 
these benefits, and more likely that information discovered as a result of 
either screening regime can be used regardless of the arrest’s legality. 
                                                          
 
 91.  See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte 
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 441–42 (2002) (“[T]he per se authority to search upon any arrest provides 
officers a compelling, volume-based incentive to execute custodial arrests for minor offenses so that 
they can uncover evidence for ‘good busts’ (that is, those leading to more serious prosecutions).”); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (there is “always the 
possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic 
arrest as a pretext to conduct a search”). 
 92.  Logan, supra note 15, at 1587. 
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a. Immigration Screening 
The benefits of immigration screening are at present unrelated to the 
lawfulness of the arrest, because the screening typically occurs before the 
arrest’s lawfulness is determined: fingerprints are taken at booking and a 
detainer may issue before the legal basis for the arrest is evaluated.93  
Even if the arrest is not backed by probable cause, or charges are either 
not filed or dismissed, federal immigration officials may take custody of 
an arrestee and place him in deportation proceedings.94  While some 
confusion remains about the reach of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,95 the key 
Supreme Court decision on point, as a general matter, even if the 
identification of an individual as an immigration violator was obtained 
through an unlawful arrest, his identity (including his immigration file) is 
not suppressible in a deportation hearing.96  Because even an unlawful 
                                                          
 
 93.  The independence of the merits of the arrest was a proverbial feature, not a bug.  See DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-12-64, OPERATIONS OF UNITED STATES 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S SECURE COMMUNITIES 6 (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-64_Mar12.pdf (“Earlier identification meant that 
ICE could remove aliens with prior convictions or immigration violations regardless of the current 
charges against them” (emphasis added)); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for 
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1150 (2013) 
(“Because immigration authorities have taken the position that federal deportation proceedings can 
effectively preempt local criminal prosecutions, sometimes defendants who post criminal bond will 
be deported before their criminal case is fully adjudicated.”). 
 94.  The DHS decision to initiate immigration proceedings often comes before any test or 
confirmation of police officers’ finding of probable cause.  See, e.g., United States v. Uriostegui, 420 
F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1261–62 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 95.  In Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), one defendant challenged the use of his identity 
to commence deportation proceedings.  Another defendant sought to have the evidence linking him 
to his immigration record suppressed.  The Supreme Court rejected both claims on the grounds that 
“[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself 
suppressible as fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or 
interrogation occurred.”  Id. at 1039.  As to the challenged identifications, the Court held that 
“evidence derived from . . . [unlawful] arrests need not be suppressed in an INS civil deportation 
hearing.”  Id. at 1051.  Confusion remains as to whether the “‘body’ or identity” statement quoted 
above “simply recognizes an established jurisdictional rule, i.e., that an unlawful arrest does not 
deprive a court of jurisdiction over the arrestee, or, instead, whether the statement establishes a 
blanket rule that a defendant’s identity—and any evidence related to that identity—is never 
suppressible.”  United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2013).  The 
confusion mostly relates to the use of fingerprints and the immigration file to which they are linked 
in criminal cases. 
 96.  In civil removal proceedings, courts read Lopez-Mendoza to mean that illegally obtained 
fingerprints and the immigration records recovered thereby are almost never excludable.  See, e.g., 
The Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Hearings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1633 (2013); Jennifer 
M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L. REV. 1563, 1624 (2010) (noting that “in many removal 
proceedings, the nature of the evidence illegally seized ensures that even when suppression occurs, 
the noncitizen will still be removable”).  The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza “left open the 
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arrest will not ordinarily affect the outcome of a subsequent removal 
proceeding,97 the probability of the extrinsic benefit materializing does 
not legally depend on the quality of that arrest. 
b. DNA Collection 
The question of whether the interest in gathering DNA is dependent 
on the lawfulness of the arrest does not have an unambiguous or a 
uniform answer across jurisdictions.98  For instance, Maryland’s DNA 
collection law allowed for the DNA sample to be taken right after arrest, 
but did not allow it to be processed or placed in a database before 
arraignment.99  About a third of those states with such laws authorize 
collection and analysis only after a judicial determination of probable 
cause or an arraignment, which assures legal dependence; however, in 
close to two-thirds of such states collection occurs in the course of 
booking, before probable cause is determined.100 
For the latter set of jurisdictions, would police lose the benefit of the 
DNA evidence if it is determined that the arrest is unlawful after a 
sample is taken, as suggested by some scholars?101  The benefits can be 
lost first through expungement (or expunction) of the profile and the 
                                                          
 
prospect that suppression may nonetheless be available in removal proceedings for egregious 
violations of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”  James L. Buchwalter, Unconstitutional Search or 
Seizure as Warranting Suppression of Evidence in Removal Proceeding, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 489, ¶ 6 
(2009).  While some courts acknowledge that suppression may be available in cases of egregious 
violations, very few cases had actually found such violations.  See, e.g., Pretzantzin v. Holder, 725 
F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2013); Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008); 
see also Chacón, supra note 96, at 1614 (discussing cases). 
 97. In deciding Lopez-Mendoza, the Court presumed that most arrests leading to deportation 
proceedings would be made by federal immigration officers (then INS), and that constitutional 
violations could be prevented by institutional internal discipline.  See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 
1044 (referring to the INS’s “comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations”).  
The introduction of Secure Communities (and prior similar initiatives) means that arrests triggering 
removal proceedings are now more commonly made by local and state law enforcers, which has led 
some to question the continuing vitality of Lopez-Mendoza.  See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 96. 
 98.  The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the question whether such collection is 
still warranted if probable cause to arrest was absent because the Maryland law required a finding of 
probable cause for the arrest before DNA collection occurs.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 
1967 (2013). 
 99.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §2-504(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 100.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296.1(a)(1)(A), 299 (West 2012) (mandating DNA 
collection immediately upon arrest), with 730 Ill. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-3 (a-3.2) (2012) (calling for 
DNA collection within 14 days of indictment, a preliminary hearing finding probable cause, or a 
waiver of a preliminary hearing). 
 101.  David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to Early DNA 
Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1, 8–9 (2012). 
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sample that should in principle follow a fruitless arrest.  However, even 
if the arrestee were ultimately acquitted of the crime or never prosecuted, 
the DNA sample and profile are retained unless conditions set by the 
jurisdiction’s expungement law are met.  While in seven states the 
expungement of DNA profiles is the responsibility of state authority, 
most states place the responsibility for initiating expungement on the 
arrestee.102  As a matter of practice, when individuals bear the burden, 
few expungements occur.103 
More directly, the police can also lose the benefit through 
suppression in a future prosecution for the crime discovered or solved 
through DNA screening, and in Maryland, whose DNA collection law 
was upheld in King, there is a statutory provision to that effect.104  North 
Carolina has a similar prohibition, and two other states have weaker 
provisions, prohibiting the use of DNA matches after the sample was 
ordered to be expunged.105  In the absence of statutory constraints, as 
Logan demonstrates, there is confusion surrounding the availability of 
the exclusionary remedy for “identity evidence,” or evidence of who the 
person is and any kind of record to which he can be linked,106 based in 
part on Lopez-Mendoza and in part on Hudson v. Michigan.107 
                                                          
 
 102.  Samuels et al., supra note 67, at 20. 
 103.  Id. at 18 (concluding on the basis of interviews with lab technicians and data provided by 
the states that “that expungements are rare in states where the individual bears the burden”); see also 
People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 761–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“The expungement process . . . 
is neither quick nor guaranteed. . . .  The arrestee must submit a request to the trial court and 
prosecutor of the county where the arrest occurred and to the DOJ’s DNA Laboratory; the court must 
then wait 180 days before it can grant the request; the court has discretion to grant or deny the 
request and its order is not reviewable by appeal or by writ.  The DNA Act appears to allow the 
prosecutor to prevent expungement merely by objecting to the request.” (citations omitted)); for an 
overview of state expungment procedures and an argument for automatic expunction, see Catherine 
A. Burke, Suspicionless DNA Collection from Arrestees Violates the Fourth Amendment, but Easier 
Expunction of DNA Records Can Help Mitigate the Harm  (Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261499. 
 104.  MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511 (West Supp. 2011). 
 105.  ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-105 (Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-266.3A (Supp. 2013). 
 106.  Logan, supra note 15, at 1581–86.  Most cases addressing the issue of identity evidence 
deal with fingerprints, but many courts presume a “clear analogy between fingerprinting and DNA 
identification under the DNA Act.”  Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2012).  Case 
law dealing specifically with DNA and cold hits has yet to take shape.  For an overview of identity 
evidence cases generally, see LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 11.4(g). 
 107.  For a discussion of Lopez-Mendoza, see supra note 95; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
591 (2006) (the exclusionary rule is “applicable only ‘where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served’—that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
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Some courts will suppress the identity of the defendant selectively, 
only if an illegal arrest “was purposefully exploited for the objective of 
obtaining fingerprints,”108 or, by extension, a DNA profile.  And many 
courts hold flatly that “the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence 
to establish the defendant’s identity in a criminal prosecution.”109  Since 
the defendant’s “identity” has come to include not just the name and 
vitals, but also the criminal history to which his identity matches, under 
this approach, a DNA match discovered after an illegal arrest can still be 
used to support prosecution.  In sum, in those jurisdictions where 
collection is permitted at booking and expungement is not automatic, the 
probability of an unlawful arrest compromising the expected benefit of a 
DNA match is low.110 
3.   Institutional Independence of Arrest Quality 
Even if the extrinsic benefit is uncorrelated with and legally 
independent of arrest quality, its pursuit may be curtailed by institutional 
discipline.  Scholars such as Nirej Sekhon and Rachel Harmon have 
recently drawn attention to the importance of departmental discretion in 
shaping arrest patterns.111  For instance, police departments determine the 
geography of enforcement and may use their discretion to police 
minority neighborhoods more intensely, resulting in unwarranted 
                                                          
 
 108.  United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 109.  United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009).  As noted supra 
note 95, there is disagreement as to whether Lopez-Mendoza “simply recognizes an established 
jurisdictional rule . . . or, instead, whether the statement establishes a blanket rule that a defendant’s 
identity—and any evidence related to that identity—is never suppressible.”  United States v. 
Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jolly, J., concurring).  Three Circuits 
concluded that a defendant’s identity is never suppressible.  See United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 
426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Roque–Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345, 346 (6th Cir. 1999).  Four other Circuits 
interpreted Lopez-Mendoza as stating purely a jurisdictional rule.  See Pretzantzin v. Holder, 725 
F.3d 161, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228–29 (4th Cir. 
2007); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1106; United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754–
55 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 110.  This conclusion pertains to both the interest in a “cold hit” and an interest in populating the 
database to increase chances of a “future” match.  If a DNA match occurs far in the future, 
presumably the unlawful arrest that led to the extraction of the sample may be challenged and 
adjudicated under the same legal principles.  It is even more unlikely that suppression will result for 
such a distant future match on account of the “attenuation of taint” doctrines. 
 111.  Sekhon, supra note 38; Harmon, supra note 35, at 805 (“[I]nternal processes provide the 
most commonly used remedy for misconduct and, in many jurisdictions, interact with other 
remedies, such as . . . external review of administrative remedies by an auditor or civilian oversight 
agency.”). 
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disparities in arrest rates.  Likewise, agency-level receptivity to collateral 
benefits would loosen the disciplinary constraints on individual officers’ 
pursuit thereof, contrary to the hopes of the Supreme and lower courts. 
Consider an officer with idiosyncratic personal preferences, such as 
animus towards some identifiable social groups.  Even if that officer 
himself does not value lawful or fruitful arrests, he is likely to be 
constrained from acting on his preferences.  Because the extrinsic 
benefit—the psychic satisfaction of harassment—accrues only to the 
officer, and the wasted arrests impact the departmental record, such an 
officer is likely to be disciplined by his department.  Departmental 
discipline may not nullify the extrinsic benefit, but it is a cost to the 
arresting officer that diminishes the expected value of the arrest. 
By contrast, an LEA that is interested in the extrinsic benefit is 
unlikely to sanction its officers for pursuing that benefit.  At the extreme, 
consider an agency that itself sets up collateral incentives by encouraging 
arrests for non-prosecutorial purposes such as order maintenance and 
street control: officers in such an agency are unlikely to suffer any 
discipline for illegal arrests made pursuant to this policy.112 
While LEAs may not overtly encourage arrests for the sake of 
deportations, LEAs’ interest in immigration enforcement predates Secure 
Communities.  Certainly not every LEA would be equally 
accommodating of its officers’ pursuit of this collateral benefit.113  Yet, 
an active interest in immigration enforcement over the past fifteen or so 
years on the part of some LEAs has been documented and analyzed in 
“crimmigration” scholarship.114  Within the past decade, some LEAs 
have voluntarily participated in immigration enforcement under the 
auspices of federal-local partnerships, of which the so-called “287(g)” 
programs and the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) are most prominent.115  
                                                          
 
 112.  For a real example of such dynamics, see, for example, Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 
845, 849 (3d Cir. 1990) (describing policy of routine arrests for public intoxication for social control 
reasons with no intention of prosecution in Pittsburgh, and reporting that “[n]ot only were no 
safeguards implemented to prevent illegal arrests for public drunkenness, but the City also followed 
an express policy of not investigating—or even accepting—complaints regarding alleged pretextual 
arrests under the charge. . . .  [R]eports of illegal public intoxication arrests were the only category of 
complaints that his Office did not accept”). 
 113. See Eagly, supra note 93 (demonstrating that LEAs differ in their approaches towards 
immigration enforcement). 
 114. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 96, 1579–95 (2010); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 591–92 (2008). 
 115.  Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to deputize and train local law enforcement agencies to perform certain functions 
of federal immigration officers, at local expense.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (Supp. 2014).  The Criminal 
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Moreover, some LEAs adopted unilateral policies of contacting ICE 
when a foreign-born person is encountered in the course of other 
enforcement activities.116  A survey of 489 agencies carried out largely 
prior to the automation of immigration screening, for example, finds that 
a large share of law enforcement agencies went to the extra effort of 
initiating immigration status inquiries: 87% of police chiefs and 89% of 
county sheriffs reported a policy or practice of checking immigration 
status for those arrested for a violent crime, and 51% and 67% 
respectively, for first-time offenders arrested for a nonviolent crime.117  
Some law enforcement organizations such as the National Sheriffs’ 
Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association publicly 
supported local involvement in enforcement, and approved of the 
automation of immigration information.118 
Likewise, law enforcers have long expressed interest in using 
biometric information to facilitate their ability to match offenders to 
unsolved offenses.  In an earlier era, law enforcement moved swiftly to 
create a universal fingerprint database, and conducted fingerprint 
“drives,” asking citizens to volunteer their fingerprints.119  The same has 
occurred with DNA, as police resort to “dragnets” seeking consent from 
people to provide their DNA to the police in the interest of more 
                                                          
 
Alien Program (CAP) is predominantly carried out by federal officers, but relies on local actors to 
facilitate ICE access to foreign-born inmates.  See Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in 
the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery, 2013 MIGRATION POLICY INST. 1, 105 
(2013), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-
states-rise-formidable-machinery. 
 116.  E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at 
*1 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (Clackamas County Jail had a “policy of notifying ICE when a foreign –
born [sic] person is brought to the Jail on a warrant or probable cause charge”).  The section of 
Arizona’s SB 1070 that contained such a policy was the only one to survive the constitutional 
challenge in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012).  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11-1051(B) (2012) (requiring state officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the 
immigration status” of any person they stop or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable 
suspicion exists that the person is . . . unlawfully present in the United States,” and provides that 
“[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined. . . .”). 
 117.  Varsanyi et al., supra note 40. 
 118.  Memorandum from the Major County Sheriffs’ Ass’n to Members of Congress (June 20, 
2013), http://www.mcsheriffs.com/pdf/news/mcsa_immigration_position_paper__final.pdf; Position 
Paper on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2013 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N 1, 2 
http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GovAffairs/NSA%20CIR%202013%2
0FINAL.pdf (asking for “[i]ncreased funding for ICE’s Criminal Alien Removal Programs, such as 
287(g) and Secure Communities”).  By contrast, some police organizations are more ambivalent.  
E.g., Law Enforcement Leaders Oppose Federal Mandate to Engage in Immigration Enforcement, 
2013 NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. 4, http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/demo 
crats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/LEA1307.pdf. 
 119.  See Cole, supra note 15, at 12. 
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effective law enforcement.120  LEAs are also engaged in creating local 
“rogue” DNA databases that are not subject to laws governing the use of 
CODIS.121  Proponents of DNA collection laws are explicit that the 
purpose of these laws is to fight crime and resolve open cases, rather than 
mere identification, the interest identified by the Supreme Court.122  
Almost all of Maryland’s 130 LEAs supported the DNA collection law 
on the grounds that the state’s “compelling interest in entering and 
maintaining DNA information in CODIS” is geared towards the 
“detect[ion of] recidivist acts and actors,” location of “missing and 
unidentified persons,” and even “deterring crime” via “[n]ews reports of 
successful investigations,” in addition to identification of arrestees.123  
Populating the database or solving cold cases is the kind of benefit that 
redounds to the agency as a whole, and is likely to compensate for lower 
quality arrests.  Disciplinary measures for the potentially unlawful arrest 
influenced by the prospect of DNA collection should not be frequent. 
In sum, Secure Communities and at least some DNA collection laws 
set up incentives to arrest on bases uncorrelated with arrest quality.  And 
benefits they provide are largely legally and institutionally independent 
of the same.  With regard to DNA collection laws, the most problematic 
are jurisdictions that both have expansive sets of collection crimes, do 
not require a finding of probable cause before collection or analysis, and 
do not provide for automatic expungement: at present, this set consists of 
                                                          
 
 120.  E.g., Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir. 2006) (case arising out of an 
investigation that involved asking over “600 men . . . to collect oral saliva swabs for DNA 
comparison.”); Troy Duster, DNA Dragnets and Race: Larger Social Context, History, and Future, 
21 GENEWATCH 1, at 3 (Dec. 2008), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/Gene 
Watch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=56&archive=yes (describing several large-scale dragnets for 
DNA samples). 
 121.  See e.g., David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1777 (2014); 
Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assembling-records-of-dna.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 122.  E.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, at 1985 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Governor of Maryland, in commenting on our decision to hear this case, said that he was glad, 
because ‘[a]llowing law enforcement to collect DNA samples . . . is absolutely critical to our efforts 
to continue driving down crime,’ and ‘bolsters our efforts to resolve open investigations and bring 
them to a resolution.’”). 
 123.  Brief of Md. Chief of Police Ass’n et al., at 9–10, 12, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 
(2013) (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 179942, at *9–10, 12.  Indeed, in the opinion of the California Court 
of Appeals, which invalidated California’s DNA collection law, “DNA taken at the time of arrest is 
not intended to be used, and cannot usefully be employed, to verify the arrestee’s identity; it is 
intended to be used and is in fact employed to investigate the arrestees’ possible involvement in 
criminal conduct unrelated to the crime of arrest and to add to the DNA database for purposes of 
future crime-solving.”  People v. Buza, 231 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1480 (2014). 
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Alabama,124 Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and South 
Dakota, all of which collect for some misdemeanors; and Alaska, North 
Dakota, and Ohio, all of which collect for all felonies.125  These 
database-screening regimes are not the only or first policy innovations 
that set up systematic collateral incentives.126 A nationally-available 
fingerprint database was among the first innovations to present similar 
concerns: it enabled police to learn about arrestees’ criminal records and 
outstanding warrants, and to facilitate future investigations by matching 
latent fingerprints from the crime scene to existing records.127  Moreover, 
collateral incentives are not limited to technological innovations.  Certain 
“New Policing”128 strategies also generate such incentives.  Insofar as 
“zero tolerance” or “order maintenance” policing aims primarily to 
demonstrate police intolerance for visible public-order violations, police 
are led to discount the intrinsic value of arrests.129  If the dominant aim of 
                                                          
 
 124.  Alabama’s law is not a paradigmatic involuntary collection law, in that it appears to allow 
arrestees to refuse to provide a sample without penalty.  ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (2013).  It is less 
clear that arrestees are made aware of their right to refuse, or how common such refusals are as a 
matter of practice. 
 125.  See NCSL, supra note 48.  California’s law, which authorized collection and analysis for 
all felonies prior to the determination of probable cause and did not provide for automatic or easy 
expungement, was declared unconstitutional under state law.  As that California court noted, 
independence of the quality of the arrest was one of the dangers of the law: “there is no check on the 
discretion of the officers who make the arrests that create the opportunity for DNA sampling until 
after the sample may have been used for investigative purposes.”  Buza, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1489. 
 126.  For example, judges worried in 1987 that “[c]urrent technology” would enable officers 
“who desire to arrest an individual” to do so by “merely leaf[ing] through the files or turn[ing] to the 
computer to determine whether they can find some reasons to arrest a suspect for whose arrest they 
otherwise lack probable cause.”  United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1189–90 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Rubin, J., dissenting). 
 127.  See Cole, supra note 15, at 63–89. 
 128.  See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000) (using 
“New Policing” to describe a complex of policing strategies including “Broken Windows,” hot-spot 
policing, community policing, and zero tolerance, among others). 
 129.  The extrinsic, symbolic value of arrests under order maintenance strategies to signal police 
readiness to enforce the law generally may be gleaned from James Q. Wilson and George L. 
Kelling’s renowned article.  George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1, 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/?single_page=true.  To deter “serious street 
crime,” they argued, it is important to disrupt unserious “disorderly behavior” by “the rowdy 
teenager, or the importuning beggar.”  Id.  Some police departments interpreted theories such as 
Kelling and Wilson’s to mean that arrests for disorderly behavior will prevent serious crimes; thus, 
many “New Policing” strategies relied on arrests for extrinsic reasons.  See, e.g., Heymann, supra 
note 128, at 429 (Noting that “‘Broken Windows’ policing . . . justified very large numbers of . . . 
misdemeanor arrests”).  To be sure, such an interpretation is not inevitable, as many experts, 
including Kelling and Wilson themselves, have argued that Broken Windows strategies are best 
pursued without resorting to arrests.  See Architect of Broken Windows Defends His Theory (Jan. 26, 
2015),  http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/revisiting-broken-windows-theory/ (“The idea that 
‘broken windows’ is, at least as I perceived it and have worked to implement it, that it’s focused on 
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the police is to get disorderly people off the street, whether charges for 
violating any specific law are sustainable becomes less important.130 
By contrast, other motivations for arrests, even if normatively 
dubious, do not present the same systematic challenges as collateral 
incentives.  Idiosyncratic personal preferences, such as animus towards 
identifiable social groups, may present an extrinsic psychic benefit to 
particular officers, but the benefit should at some point be outweighed by 
the cost of departmental discipline.  SILA doctrine may create incentives 
to arrest in hopes of finding evidence of other crimes, but the pursuit of 
that benefit is legally constrained by the exclusionary rule.  And not all 
New Policing strategies predicated on an extrinsic benefit of arrests 
create collateral incentives.  For example, New York Transit Police’s 
famous policy of combatting significant subway crime by arresting fare-
beaters did not present truly collateral incentives.  In that context, the 
explicitly acknowledged extrinsic benefit—catching subway robbers—
was in fact correlated with guilt of fare-beating: “most subway robbers 
weren’t paying the fare, and a good number of them were caught” 
through this strategy.131  Although these, and many other, considerations 
routinely influence arrest decisions, unlike collateral incentives, these 
phenomena are more amenable to the traditional, quality-based 
constraints that channel discretion, and should not be expected to 
systematically skew arrest outcomes. 
III.  THE PURPOSE OF ARREST AND DISCRETIONARY POWER 
So far, I have posited that the core purpose of arrests is prosecutorial, 
and implied that deviations from that purpose are misuses of arrest 
authority.  This Part offers historical and jurisprudential support for that 
                                                          
 
getting arrests is really a serious misconception.” (quoting Kelling)). 
 130.  For instance, Wilson and Kelling recount an example of a Newark officer engaged in such 
policing: “Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on 
side streets, but not at the main intersection . . . Persons who broke the informal rules . . . were 
arrested.”  Id.  For empirical evidence that this strategy led police to discount arrest quality, see 
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in 
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 476 (2000) (“The result [of order-maintenance policing, 
or OMP] was a vast increase in misdemeanor arrests, but also a sharp decline in their quality and 
sustainability in court. . . .  As arrests increased under OMP, the rate at which prosecutors declined 
to pursue these cases rose dramatically.”). 
 131.  See William Bratton, Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police 
Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, 13 (July 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/170610-1.pdf (pointing out the dramatic 
decreases in the rates of subway crime). 
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proposition, and articulates the normative problem presented by 
collateral incentives to arrest. 
A.   Discretion and the Prosecution Principle 
Discretion wielded by law enforcers has long attracted scholarly 
attention.132  Whether discretion is intentionally vested in the hands of a 
state actor,133 or exists of necessity,134 how it is used is rarely a matter of 
indifference.  An express grant or toleration of pure discretion, unguided 
by principle or standards, is rare, and seems on its face to be anathema to 
the rule of law.  Instead, an actor vested with discretionary authority is 
ordinarily guided by some public interest or purpose.  The relevant 
purpose could be broadly or narrowly defined.  For instance, in making 
bail decisions, the judicial officer is typically directed to use his 
discretion to advance the “primary purpose of bail,” which is to assure 
the charged individual’s appearance in court.135  In other contexts, the 
actor is expected to use his discretion towards the end of doing “what is 
just and proper under the circumstances,”136 such as in the case of 
prosecutorial discretion.  Whether narrowly or broadly defined, some 
uses of discretionary authority are clearly contrary to the purposes 
guiding that authority.  Thus, an abuse of discretion occurs when 
                                                          
 
 132.  The scholarly literature is too vast and rich to do it justice in a footnote. For a few classic 
works of lasting influence dealing with police discretion, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE 
DISCRETION (1975); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–90 (1993); EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK (1990). 
 133.  For a virtue-based defense of discretion, see Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative 
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1669 (2010) 
(articulating a defense of discretion on “aretaic” grounds of “moral particularism”); on the 
inevitability of discretion, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 580 (2001) (“Even in a world where all crimes are to be enforced across the 
board, across-the-board enforcement cannot mean that everyone is arrested. Someone must identify 
the system’s targets,” and “careful review of each” is virtually impossible); on the social optimality 
of discretion, see Steven Shavell, Optimal Discretion in the Application of Rules, 9 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 175, 176 (2007) (“If it would be socially desirable for decisions to depend upon the 
information bound up in the unincluded variables [i.e. not specified in the law], giving discretion to 
[officials] may be beneficial.”). 
 134.  Discretion exists of necessity because it is impossible to craft any rule that precludes the 
need for judgment or decision. 
 135.  E.g., People v. Norman, 252 Cal. App. 2d 381, 411–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).  State penal 
codes commonly provide for specific considerations that ought to weigh in the judges’ decision, for 
example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014) (“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, 
a judge . . . shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense 
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at 
trial or at a hearing of the case.”). 
 136.  See, e.g., Burdeshaw v. Snell, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1202 (M.D. Ala. 2005). 
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authority that is legally allotted to an actor is manifestly used to thwart 
the values that justified that authority.  Some abuses of discretion are 
sanctionable by law but many lesser abuses—or, to use a broader term, 
misuses—of it are not. 
Discretionary authority involved in arresting is multi-dimensional.  
The particular concern in this article is with the individual officer’s 
affirmative decision to make a custodial arrest, rather than taking another 
enforcement action or no action.  While the law of arrest differs in its 
particulars across jurisdictions, it leaves that decision largely to the 
discretion of the arresting officer, once the criteria legally justifying an 
arrest are met.137  The purposes that should guide police discretion in this 
respect are rarely made explicit.  It is easy enough to state what justifies 
an arrest as a legal matter, but not for what reasons, and on the basis of 
what considerations such arrests ought to be made.  As Surell Brady 
observes, “the purposes of arrest often are unarticulated, the standards for 
the exercise of the decision to arrest are virtually nonexistent, and the 
requirement of a nexus between millions of arrests and legitimate state 
interests does not exist.”138 
The lack of an articulated standard should lead us neither to the 
conclusion that there are no guiding principles for the discretion to arrest, 
nor to the conclusion that the guiding principles are as broad as a 
directive to pursue the “public interest.”  Indeed, to many influential 
scholars active through the 1960s, such as Wayne LaFave, it appeared to 
have been more or less settled that arrests “made for purposes other than 
the sole legitimate objective of prosecution” represented misuses of the 
discretion to arrest.139  As Frank Remington put it, “[i]n the 1960s the 
formal law seemed clearly to say that the police responsibility was to 
arrest those who violate the law, not to decide if and when to enforce the 
criminal code.  The formal law also seemed to say, although less clearly, 
                                                          
 
 137.  For felony arrests, the legal requirement is at minimum probable cause for an arrest in 
public, and a warrant for an arrest inside the home.  Legal standards for misdemeanor arrests differ 
across jurisdictions, with some retaining the requirement that the misdemeanor be committed in the 
presence of the officer to justify arrests.  Some statutes further spell out what officers should 
consider in deciding whether to cite or make a custodial arrest for minor violations or misdemeanors, 
once the decision to take some enforcement action is made.  E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 431.015 (West 
Supp. 2013) (officer should issue a citation instead of an arrest “if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person . . . will appear to answer the charge.”). 
 138.  Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 
27–28 (2000). 
 139.  LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 9.1(e); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE 
A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 438 (1965) [hereinafter LAFAVE, ARREST] (suggesting that “the practice 
of arresting for purposes other than prosecution,” although common, is “not authorized by law”). 
2015] COLLATERAL INCENTIVES TO ARREST 591 
that the only proper function of arrest was to take custody of an offender 
for purposes of prosecution.”140  The decision to arrest, in other words, 
should always be made at least in contemplation of prosecution. 
What does it mean to say that arrest decisions ought to be guided by 
an interest in prosecution?  At the very least, it implies the following 
propositions.  The officer should intend to complete all the procedural 
steps required of him to ensure that the arrestee can be prosecuted.  One 
thing that is inevitably required of him is a showing of the evidentiary 
basis to believe the arrestee committed the crime for which he is arrested.  
Because the evidence on the basis of which the arrest was made should 
support prosecution, the contemplated charges should be for the conduct 
on the basis of which the arrest is made (if not precisely for the offense 
identified by the arresting officer).  Arresting for the purpose of 
prosecution implies further that considerations irrelevant to prosecution 
are improper grounds on which to base arrest decisions.  To the extent an 
officer is basing his decision to arrest on something irrelevant to 
prosecution, he is not acting in the interests of the latter purpose.  What 
considerations are irrelevant to prosecution is a complex question, but it 
can be answered in the abstract without classifying each factor that ever 
influenced arrest decisions.  Relevant considerations likely go beyond 
those facts that comprise probable cause strictly speaking, but 
evidentiary reasons that signal probability of guilt and culpability are 
plainly relevant.  The suspect’s astrological sign, place of origin, or 
officer’s personal animosity are plainly not, unless these factors 
somehow figure in the description of a specific suspect.141  I will refer to 
the claim that decisions ought to be guided by an interest in prosecution 
as the “prosecution principle” for short. 
Even prior to the 1960s, when LaFave and Remington asserted the 
viability of the prosecution principle as a matter of law, police routinely 
made arrests for other purposes and on irrelevant bases.142  Police 
certainly do so today, and the law provides for almost no real sanctions 
for so doing.  And prosecution does not actually follow a very high share 
                                                          
 
 140.  Frank J. Remington, LaFave on Arrest and the Three Decades That Have Followed, 1993 
U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 316 (1993). 
 141.  Difficult questions might be asked about characteristics such as unemployment, 
appearance, or bad character, which might raise the probability of charges and a successful 
prosecution as an empirical matter, but are irrelevant as a matter of law.  For the present purposes, I 
sidestep these concerns and presume these kinds of factors are irrelevant to the likelihood of 
successful prosecution. 
 142.  LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 139, at 438 (documenting a variety of non-prosecutorial 
purposes for arrests). 
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of arrests.  One might conclude that the prosecution principle articulated 
by LaFave, Remington, and others has no relevance for contemporary 
policing.  This, I suggest, is an unwarranted conclusion. 
While legislative action has explicitly extended the permissible 
purposes of arrests to a limited extent, the prosecution principle retains 
normative force in policing jurisprudence.  What changed over time are 
the legal consequences of arrest made in contravention of that principle.  
In the following sections, I offer a reductive account of the origins and 
evolution of the prosecution principle in jurisprudence, to demonstrate its 
contemporary relevance.  In an era when officers had little occasion for 
discretionary decisions, that principle generated robust, enforceable 
limits on arrest practices.  With the emergence of modern professional 
police forces and the increasing scope for police discretion, the legal 
limits on arresting behavior deriving from that principle became quixotic, 
and faded away.  The prosecution principle as normative principle, 
however, persists in the background of policing and criminal 
jurisprudence as a guide for police discretion, rather than a legal 
mandate.  Instead of legally sanctioning contrary arresting behavior as in 
the past, the prosecution principle is now best viewed as channeling 
arresting behavior towards the same ends.  The prosecution principle is 
an aspiration.143  As such, it is not a demand that police act on the purest 
of motives, but solely that they be guided by it in the absence of explicit 
legislative authorization to arrest for other purposes.  That aspiration is 
evoked when the Supreme Court refers to “the state of mind which is 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the 
officer’s action”144 in the context of arrests. 
                                                          
 
 143.  Nonetheless, some scholars have made or implied reasonable arguments that the principle 
is implicit in the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process guarantees.  See Brady, supra note 138, at 
27–28 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrests constitute unreasonable seizures if 
the state as a whole is not willing or capable of prosecuting most arrestees).  Thomas Davies has 
consistently argued that “the historical record actually indicates that the American Framers intended 
to preserve common-law arrest and search standards—standards that appeared to be settled and 
uncontroversial during the framing era—in the ‘law of the land’ and ‘due process of law’ clauses . . . 
and in the ‘due process of law’ clause of the federal Fifth Amendment.”  Thomas Y. Davies, How 
the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded 
Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4–5 (2010) [hereinafter 
Davies, Bare-Probable-Cause]; Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-
Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due 
Process of Law”, 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 9 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Correcting History].  If Davies is 
correct, then the prosecution principle, part of that common-law arrest law, is also one which the 
Framers intended to preserve. 
 144.  Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
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B.   The Evolution of the Prosecution Principle 
1.    The Reign of the Prosecution Principle 
The common law of arrest, as it stood during the Founding era, 
offered little room for discretion with regard to arrest—and thus, little 
room for the misuse of discretion.  Common law definitions of arrests 
were explicit that this deprivation of liberty is intended to make possible 
the prosecution of criminals for their crimes.  Blackstone defined arrest 
as “the apprehending or restraining of one’s person, in order to . . . 
answer to an alleged or suspected crime.”145  The authority of 
constables, the early law enforcers, was largely ministerial: they were 
tasked with the execution of judicial warrants and did not conduct 
criminal investigations.146  Constables as well as private individuals did 
have a limited authority to make warrantless arrests on their own 
initiative.  However, these occasions presented few opportunities to 
freely decide whether or not to arrest, and all the incentives favored 
arrests that would lead to prosecution and conviction. 
Warrantless arrest authority was predicated on the crime having been 
committed in fact.147  Constables and private persons were authorized to 
arrest for a felony if the arrested person was actually guilty—that is, 
eventually convicted, or for a felony committed in fact in their presence, 
or if the felony was committed in fact and there was a “probable cause of 
suspicion” that the arrestee committed it.148  Thomas Davies offers 
convincing evidence that “warrantless misdemeanor arrests were limited 
to instances in which the guilt of the arrestee was plain because the 
arresting person actually witnessed the commission of the offense—the 
‘committed-in-the-presence-of’ requirement,” and the misdemeanor was 
an on-going “breach of the peace.”149 
                                                          
 
 145.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289 (emphasis added). 
 146.  Davies, Correcting History, supra note 143, at 28 (“Constables, the primary peace officers 
of that period, did not possess the sort of discretionary ex officio arrest authority that modern police 
officers exercise. . . . [T]he constable acted with the full authority . . . of the law only when he acted 
pursuant to a judicial warrant.” (emphasis added)). 
 147.  Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study 
of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239, 321 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Fictional Originalism] (“no arrest could be 
lawful unless it was based on a sworn accusation that a specific crime had been committed ‘in 
fact’”). 
 148.  Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
631–34 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth Amendment]. 
 149.  Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 147, at 324–25 (2002) (citing sources).  
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Constables or private individuals were severely constrained in their 
ability to decide when to make an arrest and for what purpose.  
Warrantless arrests that were legally justified were often also mandated.  
With regard to felonies, in Blackstone’s words, “[a]ny private person 
(and ά fortiori a peace-officer) that is present when any felony is 
committed is bound by the law to arrest the felon.”150  While witnessed 
felonies gave rise to a duty to arrest, arrests for unwitnessed felonies 
presented a risk of liability in trespass for an unlawful arrest, as well as 
lawful resistance by the arrestee.151  Liability for unlawful arrests was 
even broader for misdemeanors.152  Thus, the decision whether or not to 
make an arrest in any given instance was greatly limited by these duties 
and liabilities. 
It was also taken for granted that a lawful arrest would be promptly 
followed by prosecution.153  The committal procedure employed at the 
time required that anyone who made a felony arrest: 
promptly take the arrestee to a justice of the peace for the justice to 
decide whether to bail the arrestee, commit him to prison, or release 
him.  The justice was required to take and record, in writing, the sworn 
information of the complainant . . . and any additional witnesses the 
complainant could provide.  In effect, this procedure put some pressure 
on a complainant to offer prima facie, sworn proof of the guilt of the 
arrestee contemporaneously with the arrest.154 
There was no room for the arresting person to release the arrestee 
without formally beginning prosecution, because doing so would subject 
                                                          
 
Although the scope of common law misdemeanor arrest authority remains contested, a question that 
was at the heart of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the substance of the 
disagreement matters little for the present purposes. 
 150.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *293 (emphasis added). 
 151.  Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 147, at 625 (“‘Unlawful’ (unjustified) 
arrests . . . exposed the officer to lawful resistance . . . .”). 
 152.  Davies, Fictional Originalism, supra note 147, at 324, 325 (2002) (“Acquittal of the 
arrested person following a warrantless misdemeanor arrest meant that the arrest was unlawful and 
an actionable trespass,” and “[a] person who made a warrantless misdemeanor arrest that did not 
comply with the committed-in-the-presence-of, during-the-commission-of, breach-of-the-peace, or 
similar requirements was exposed to trespass liability for an unlawful arrest regardless of the 
conviction of the misdemeanant.”). 
 153.  Davies, Correcting History, supra note 143, at 57–58 identifies a few potential exceptions: 
flight of a suspected felon, hue and cry, and temporary arrest authority of night watchmen with 
respect to night walkers. An arrest of the “dangerously insane” was another exception.  See infra 
notes 209–210 and accompanying text. 
 154. Davies, Bare-Probable-Cause, supra note 143, at 13 n.39; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to 
be brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest.”). 
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him to liability for illegal arrest.  Likewise, there was little room to 
investigate post-arrest, since proof of guilt was required promptly 
thereafter.  Moreover, other incentives reinforced the imperative to arrest 
in every permissible instance and to abstain when the arrest could be 
unlawful: constables were paid in a fee-per-service basis, rather than a 
salary, which encouraged every arrest that would not result in liability.  
And private individuals paid fees to initiate prosecutions, which further 
discouraged false arrests.155  In short, the common law of arrest in the 
Founding era and the Early Republic effectively “enforced” the 
prosecution principle, rendering unlawful many arrests that were not 
followed by prosecution, and supported by incentives that discouraged 
arrests not resulting in conviction. 
The law of arrest became more permissive just as American cities 
were inaugurating professional police forces.156  Nonetheless, mid-
nineteenth and early twentieth century cases were explicit about the 
purposes that justify the arrest power.  For example, a North Carolina 
court explained that arrests are necessary because “[i]t concerns the 
public that all who commit felonies should be punished,” and thus, 
“provided there be proof that a felony has been committed,” “an 
officer . . . may justify the arrest of a suspected person for the purpose of 
bringing him before a committing magistrate.”157  Relying on common 
law authorities such as Coke, Blackstone, and Hale, courts declared that 
“if felony is done, and one hath suspicion upon probable matter that 
another is guilty of it, he may arrest the party so suspected, to the end 
that he may be brought to justice.”158  Another court was explicit that the 
prosecution principle is a legal imperative: some arrests “may be [made] 
without a warrant, but it is only for the purpose of taking the offender 
before a Magistrate.  He may be taken and detained, until he can be 
committed to the custody of the law.  The arrest is for no other 
purpose.”159 
                                                          
 
 155.  Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 550–52 (1992) 
(citing literature). 
 156.  See id. at 553 (“Uniformed police spread across the United States to most cities . . . 
between 1850 and 1880.”); Davies, Correcting History, supra note 143, at 191 (dating the “creation” 
of police discretion to the withering of the committed-in-fact requirement and the acceptance of 
“bare” probable cause). 
 157.  Brockway v. Crawford, 48 N.C. 433, 437–39 (1856). 
 158.  Martin v. Houck, 141 N.C. 317, 322 (1906) (quoting Ashley’s Case, 12 Coke, 90); see also 
Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281, 285 (1850) (explaining why peace officers were granted greater 
arrest authority than ordinary citizens, and stating that this authority is “for the purpose of detaining 
the party to await further proceedings under a complaint on oath and a warrant thereon.”). 
 159.  Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293, 318 (1852). 
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Notably, the prosecution principle was treated as a legal imperative 
even after the rise of urban police created some space for discretion.  For 
instance, in an 1878 Massachusetts case, an action was brought against 
the town constable, who arrested the plaintiff without a warrant for 
drunkenness in a public place, but then released him.  The constable 
never made a complaint against the drunk or sought a warrant for his 
arrest, and the plaintiff then sued for false imprisonment.  The court held 
that an arrest “was only authorized as preliminary to a complaint and 
judicial proceeding, and that the officer making such arrest was liable to 
an action for assault and false imprisonment if he omitted to take the 
party arrested before the proper tribunal and to complain against him for 
the crime of drunkenness.”160  Although the statute invoked by the 
constable was couched in permissive, discretionary terms,161 the court 
declined to interpret the statute in a way that would “change the purpose 
of the arrest when made” and grant the officers “a discretion so wide and 
so liable to abuse.”162  “[T]o detain the person arrested in custody for any 
purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal,” as 
another court held.163  Thus, nineteenth and early twentieth century 
police officers were liable in tort, or even criminally liable,164 when they 
made arrests for purposes other than commencing prosecutions. 
                                                          
 
 160.  Phillips v. Fadden, 125 Mass. 198, 200 (1878). 
 161.  Id. at 200–01 (“‘Whoever is found in a state of intoxication in a public place . . . may be 
apprehended by any . . . [peace] officer . . . . The officer may then make a complaint against him for 
the crime of drunkenness.’” (citation omitted)). 
 162.  Id. at 201 (“When the Legislature provides for an arrest by a peace-officer, we must 
understand that the arrest intended is such as is incident to the service of legal process.  The custody 
is to be temporary only, to continue until the party arrested is in a condition proper for his 
appearance in court.  The provision, that the officer may then make a complaint for the crime of 
drunkenness, only means that he need not make the complaint until then.”). 
 163.  Newhall v. Egan, 28 R.I. 584, 589 (1908) (citing cases); see also Brock v. Stimson, 108 
Mass. 520, 522 (1871) (“The statute authorizes the arrest without a warrant, only as a preliminary 
step towards taking the prisoner before a court”); Caffrey v. Drugan, 144 Mass. 294, 295 (1887) (“It 
is still the duty of the officer to make complaint after having arrested without a warrant.”); Doherty 
v. Shea, 320 Mass. 173, 175 (1946) (“The person arrested has the right to be brought before the 
court.”). 
 164.  People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 153 (1891) (“[I]f [the appellant] did not make the arrest in 
good faith, and . . . carried [a woman] into Placer county without any intention of taking her before 
the magistrate issuing the warrant, . . . and did not in fact take her before any magistrate, then they 
must find him guilty [of kidnapping].”). 
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2.   The Rise and Recognition of Police Discretion 
Well into the twentieth century, these cases continued to be cited as 
precedential authority.165  By the turn of the century, police forces 
became well-entrenched in cities, and took on the investigative functions 
that were previously the province of the judicial magistrates.  Arrests 
made for the purposes of investigation clearly contravened the 
prosecution principle because “arrest, even on probable cause, [was] not 
properly a vehicle for the investigation of crime.”166  Spurring police to 
use arrests even more creatively, modern police were tasked with 
functions “unexpected by their original creators.”167  In addition to 
investigation and arrests of known offenders, “police took in tramps, 
returned lost children by the thousands, . . . enforced sanitation laws,” 
and “dispensed forms of welfare in response to the pressing demands of 
citizens.”168  This expansion in functions brought with it many 
opportunities to misuse the arrest power.169  And by all accounts, police 
embraced these opportunities, commonly “us[ing] their own judgment 
about when to arrest and for what purpose.”170 
For decades, police discretion remained below the radar of courts 
and legislatures.171  As a result, “the great majority of arrests by police 
officers [we]re illegal under the letter of the law.”172  For example, 
though officers were generally sanctioned by the law for releasing 
arrestees, the practical pressures to do so became “irresistible:” in an 
attempt to guard themselves, police made prisoners sign an agreement 
                                                          
 
 165.  See, e.g., Doherty v. Shea, 320 Mass. 173, 175 (1946) (“[T]he failure of the officer or 
someone in his behalf, to make a complaint against [the arrestee] renders the officer liable for false 
imprisonment.” (citing Phillips v. Fadden, 125 Mass. 198, 200–01 (1878))). 
 166.  James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and 
Rescue, 47 GEO. L. J. 1, 23 (1958). 
 167.  Monkkonen, supra note 155, at 554. 
 168.  Id. at 554–55 (concluding that police virtually became “city servants as well a crime-
control officers”). 
 169.  As Monkkonen notes, the rise of the uniformed police officer (1850s-1880s) also made 
these more visible to the community, and community members were able to ask them for aid in non-
criminal matters.  Id. at 551. 
 170.  WALKER, supra note 132, at 10; Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: 
Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 63 (1976) (“[T]here has been a 
growing realization that the cop on the beat often exercises discretion in his decision to invoke or not 
to invoke the criminal process.”); see also CULP DAVIS, supra note 132, at 1–3. 
 171.  See Wayne LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law–Part I, 1962 WIS. L. REV. 
104 (1962). 
 172.   Sam Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (1941–1942). 
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not to sue them.173  Among others, LaFave and Kenneth Culp Davis 
documented arrests of drunks, prostitutes, gamblers and transvestites to 
control disorder, to punish, and sometimes to provide social services (as 
in the case of prostitutes, who could be medically examined in 
custody).174  Barrett’s study of California arrests in 1960 found that 28.5 
percent of all arrested for felonies were released without the filing of 
formal charges.175  Police releases were attributable to a particularly 
problematic use of arrests “for investigation” or “on suspicion.”176  As 
the Supreme Court would soon recognize in Terry v. Ohio, the practices 
amounted to “the wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police 
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently 
complain.”177 
The “wide gulf between the law and the practices of the police”178 
narrowed only slowly in the first few decades of the twentieth century.  
In the 1930s, the Uniform Arrest Act proposed a limited set of 
circumstances where a police officer could release a prisoner lawfully, 
while still cautioning against “indiscriminate release[s].”179  And a few 
legislatures adopted laws to the same effect.180  Even in relaxing the legal 
implications of the prosecution principle, the Uniform Arrest Act 
reaffirmed its normative force: an “officer . . . should not be encouraged 
to arrest precipitously by being permitted to repent on the way to the 
station.”181  A few legislatures also followed the Arrest Act in 
recognizing detentions for questioning to determine whether an arrest 
should be made, presaging Terry seizures.182  But a real recognition of 
police discretion did not come until the ABF Survey of the 
                                                          
 
 173.  Id. at 337–38. 
 174.  See LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 139, at 450–82; CULP DAVIS, supra note 132, at ch. 1. 
 175.  Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Release or Charge, 
50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 33 (1962). 
 176.  A review of practices of the DC police in 1960–61 found that “in almost every case the 
person arrested for investigation was searched, and photographed and finger-printed for the police 
files,” in over twenty percent the person was taken from his or another’s home, and “approximately 
fifty-five per cent were held for more than four hours.”  Yale Kamisar, Report and 
Recommendations of the Commissioner’s Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 1502, 1506 (1963). 
 177.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); see also CULP DAVIS, supra note 132, at 14–20 
(describing arrests made intentionally to harass). 
 178.  Barrett, supra note 175, at 21 n.53. 
 179.  Warner, supra note 172, at 338. 
 180.  Barrett, supra note 175, at 24. 
 181.  Warner, supra note 172, at 338. 
 182.  Barrett, supra note 175, 24 n.61. 
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Administration of Criminal Justice in the 1950s,183 with the Supreme 
Court’s reckoning with the same arriving even later. 
3.   The Terry Division of Labor 
Terry v. Ohio was key in accommodating the realities of modern 
policing to the historical prosecution principle.  The salient dimensions 
of the decision are its dispensation with probable cause and the adoption 
of a lower standard of suspicion for a category of lesser intrusions, and 
the reliance on constitutional reasonableness.  A less conspicuous aspect 
of the decision was to implicitly reaffirm the prosecution principle.  By 
contrast with the brief seizure and “frisk” in Terry, full-scale arrests, as 
the Court emphasized, are a “wholly different kind of intrusion upon 
individual freedom,” which “is inevitably accompanied by future 
interference with the individual’s freedom of movement.”184  An arrest 
“eventuate[s] in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime,”185 
and heralds the “the initial stage of a criminal prosecution . . . intended 
to vindicate society’s interest in having its laws obeyed.”186  The Court 
cited LaFave for this proposition, suggesting agreement with his 
contention about the purposes of arrests.187 
The Court recognized that seizures short of arrests were necessary 
precisely because a legitimate need, such as “a perfectly reasonable 
apprehension of danger[,] may arise long before the officer is possessed 
of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the 
purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.”188  The Court chose to 
recognize a distinct set of seizures to allow the police to serve this 
legitimate need—by implication preserving the traditional prosecutorial 
purposes of full arrests.  The decision created a division of labor within 
the universe of personal seizures, where “the interests each [kind of 
intrusion] is designed to serve are . . . quite different.”189  This division of 
labor meant that police may not pursue the interests that justify only 
                                                          
 
 183.  Allen, supra note 170, at 63; WALKER, supra note 132, at 6 (“[P]rior to the late 1950s, 
[even] the leading experts in the field barely acknowledged [the] existence [of discretion].”). 
 184.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 185.  Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 186.   Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
   187.   Id. at 26 n.22; in pages cited by the Court, LaFave suggests, inter alia, that arresting “for 
purposes other than prosecution,” such as the “administration of certain social services” is of 
“doubtful propriety.”  LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 139, at 12.  
 188.  Id. at 26–27. 
 189.  Id. at 26. 
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temporary seizures by means “that approach the conditions of arrest.”190  
In Justice Brennan’s words, “[a] brief detention is usually sufficient as a 
practical matter to accomplish all legitimate law enforcement objectives 
with respect to individuals whom the police do not have probable cause 
to arrest.”191 
Terry represented both a concession and a much needed 
accommodation to the realities of modern policing.  It allowed the police 
the space to “enforce” laws for which prosecution is not deemed 
necessary—whether it is because police do not think the administrative 
costs of a full arrest are worth it or because they believe that a temporary 
seizure will in fact prevent or disrupt criminal conduct and serve public 
order.  Indeed, merely disrupting crimes without prosecution 
characterized police strategies with regard to vice, public order offenses 
such as public drinking, or gang-related ordinances at the time, and the 
Terry division of labor accommodated these approaches.192 
Of course, crime prevention and disruption are not the only common 
non-prosecutorial goals of modern policing.  Police acquired new 
functions outside investigation and criminal law enforcement—notably 
community caretaking and peacekeeping—which are now broadly 
accepted institutional purposes of the police.193  One might suppose that 
these new, patently non-prosecutorial functions of modern policing 
signaled a retrenchment from the prosecution principle.  This would be a 
hasty conclusion.  The acceptance of these functions in general does not 
imply that it has become legitimate to use arrests for these purposes.  
Indeed, judicial treatment of the community caretaking functions 
suggests that unless explicitly authorized by statute, arrests for 
caretaking purposes are the exception, not the norm.  State and federal 
courts are divided on the scope of the community caretaking exception 
                                                          
 
 190.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). 
 191.  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 363 n.2 (1983) (J. Brennan, concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
 192.  See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, 
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 61–62 (1968) (detailing common uses of Terry stops). 
 193.  See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (“Local police officers . . . 
engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, 
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation 
of a criminal statute.”); United States v. Rideau, 949 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir. 1991), opinion rev’d on 
reh’g on other grounds, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (officers must “‘aid individuals who are in 
danger of physical harm,’ ‘assist those who cannot care for themselves,’ and ‘provide other services 
on an emergency basis’” (quoting I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard § 1–2.2 at 31–32 
(2d ed. 1980))). 
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from the warrant and probable cause requirements.194  However, when 
courts do uphold seizures of persons for community caretaking purposes 
without relying on a legislative grant of authority, they anchor their 
opinions in Terry, implicitly incorporating its division of labor between 
arrests and lesser seizures. 
In the course of community caretaking, courts recognize, “a police 
officer may have occasion to seize a person . . . in order to ensure the 
safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any suspected 
criminal activity.”195  If courts readily held that community caretaking 
could serve as the primary justification for a full custodial arrest, in the 
absence of any statutory authority that would signal a significant erosion 
of the prosecution principle.  However, seizures of persons upheld by 
courts for this purpose have been brief in duration, comparable to the 
investigative stop addressed in Terry.196  Although some authorities 
suggest that community caretaking may justify arrests,197 a closer 
examination reveals that cases purportedly justifying arrests on the basis 
of community caretaking are in fact dealing with temporary seizures.198  
For example, a seizure of a juvenile found in an isolated area at night 
“for the brief time it took the officers to call his mother,”199 a brief stop 
of a “man . . . standing in the middle of the road and possibly 
intoxicated,”200 a “brief” detention of a potentially intoxicated driver to 
                                                          
 
 194.  See, e.g., Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 556 (7th Cir. 2014) (courts are 
“divided on the question of whether the community caretaker exception applies outside of the 
automobile context”). 
 195.  United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 196.  The primary distinction between a brief seizure as in Terry and a full arrest is temporal 
duration, although the “scope” of the intrusion may also matter.  See LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 
9.2(f). 
 197.  See e.g., Goldsmith v. Snohomish Cnty., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2008) 
(claiming that some circuits “have held that the ‘community caretaking’ function applies to arrests as 
well as searches”). 
 198.  E.g., the cases cited in Goldsmith v. Snohomish Cnty., in support for this claim all dealt 
with temporary seizures: Rideau, 949 F.2d at 719 (at issue is a “brief detention”); Winters v. Adams, 
254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (at issue is the authority to “briefly detain”); King, 990 F.2d at 
1561 (at issue is whether defendant could be “briefly detained”).  In Goldsmith itself, although the 
court described the seizure as an “arrest,” it was explicit that at issue was a “brief” arrest “for the 
sole purpose of enabling paramedics to render necessary medical aid” to the arrestee.  558 F. Supp. 
2d at 1152.  Moreover, the court misleadingly defined an arrest as a generic seizure, which applies to 
both a Terry-level seizure and a full arrest, without distinguishing the two.  558 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 
(“An arrest occurs when, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free 
to leave.”). 
 199.  State v. Acrey, 148 Wash. 2d 738, 753 (2003) (quoting State v. Acrey, 110 Wash. App. 
796–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 200.  Rideau, 949 F.2d at 720. 
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investigate his competence to drive201 or a driver presenting another 
hazard to advise him thereof,202 are examples of the lawful exercises of 
the community caretaking. 
Significantly, courts are explicit that the police power to seize 
individuals for “non-investigatory” purposes is rooted in the rationale of 
Terry and reasonableness analysis.  Although it dealt with suspicion of 
criminal activity, courts have read the decision as extending to 
“‘[e]ncounters [that] are initiated by the police for a wide variety of 
purposes.’”203  Absence of criminal suspicion, as one court explains, 
“does not render such a seizure unreasonable per se as Terry only 
requires ‘specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant [an] 
intrusion’ into the individual’s liberty.”204  To ascertain whether a seizure 
is reasonable, the court resorts to “essentially the Terry test, but applied 
in a community caretaker setting.”205  As in Terry, “the governmental 
interest in . . . ensuring the public safety,” for example, “is sufficiently 
important to outweigh the relatively minor intrusions . . . .”206  
Accordingly, whether at issue is “a Terry or [a] community caretaking 
stop,” it “justifies ‘no more than a brief [seizure and] interrogation.’”207  
By contrast, there is no room for reasonableness balancing with respect 
                                                          
 
 201.  Winters, 254 F.3d at 762, 766. 
 202.  King, 990 F.2d at 1560–61 (holding that the officer “was justified in approaching 
Defendants’ car and could have briefly detained Defendants in order to inform [him] of the 
hazardous conditions and to advise him to cease honking”); Ullom v. Miller, 227 W. Va. 1, 13 
(2010) (trooper’s “initial encounter with Ms. Ullom was properly admissible pursuant herein to the 
‘community caretaker doctrine’ exception . . . [until he] was assured that Ms. Ullom was not in 
actual need of emergency aid, [at which point] his caretaking duties were over and any further 
detention . . . would have constituted an unreasonable seizure”). 
 203.  Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1574 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 13); see also Winters, 254 F.3d at 
763–64 (“The Court simply cannot conclude that the strictures of Terry and its progeny compel” its 
limitation to suspicion of criminal wrongdoing). 
 204.  King, 990 F.2d at 1560–61 (“Whether the seizure of a person by a police officer acting in 
his or her noninvestigatory capacity is reasonable depends on whether it is based on specific 
articulable facts and requires a reviewing court to balance the governmental interest . . . and the 
individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary government interference” (citing United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)); see also Debra Livingston, 
Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 300 (1998) 
(“The Court’s decision in Cady . . . provides support for using a reasonableness approach in 
assessing community caretaking intrusions.”). 
 205.  State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 206.  King, 990 F.2d at 1560–61.  Some of the detentions upheld as an exercise of community 
caretaking were likely longer than the brief detention in Terry; however, as with investigative 
detentions, although these “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary,” their duration 
and scope “will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”  
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
 207.  Shields v. Tracy, No. CIVS031614DFL-PAN, 2005 WL 1490300, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 
2005) (citing United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
2015] COLLATERAL INCENTIVES TO ARREST 603 
to custodial arrests, for which “the requisite ‘balancing’ has been 
performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in . . . probable 
cause.”208 
For exceptional situations—namely, to prevent suicide or restrain 
certain mentally ill individuals—custodial arrests, or detentions 
tantamount to arrests, have been historically recognized as appropriate.209  
However, this should not be taken as a sign of abandonment of the 
prosecution principle in the face of uniquely modern realities.  The 
authority to arrest one “who is so insane as to be dangerous to himself or 
others,” without judicial authorization, is as old as the authority to arrest 
felons.210  Moreover, arrests of the mentally ill or suicidal individuals 
have become regulated by statute.211  Courts that uphold arrests for these 
purposes are recognizing an affirmative grant of authority by the 
legislature, rather than rejecting the prosecution principle.212 
In sum, unless otherwise authorized by statute, 213 courts have tended 
to view community caretaking and other non-investigative purposes as 
on the Terry side of the division of labor, justifying only “lesser 
government intrusions into an individual’s liberty.”214 
C.   Prosecution Principle as Guide for Discretion 
Terry and its extended progeny deal with the explicit, official 
purposes advanced by the police to justify seizures.  But the normative 
force of the prosecution principle has also led courts to disapprove of 
                                                          
 
 208.  Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979). 
 209.  Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing cases across circuits to the 
same effect). 
 210.  D. A. Cox, Annotation, Right, Without Judicial Proceeding, to Arrest and Detain One Who 
Is, or Is Suspected of Being, Mentally Deranged, 92 A.L.R.2d 570, at I.2. (Originally published in 
1963). 
 211.  Id. at III.9. (“Many jurisdictions have adopted statutes dealing in varying degrees with the 
arrest and confinement of the insane and mentally incompetent.”). 
 212.  See, e.g., Monday, 118 F.3d at 1103 (arrest to prevent suicide did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment or the state’s law providing for such seizures). 
 213.  Some courts decline to extend the community caretaking justification beyond the 
automobile context recognized in Cady without an affirmative statutory recognition of that authority.  
E.g., State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 1059 (Or. 1988) (“There is no generic ‘community 
caretaking function.’  Whether law enforcement officers have specific functions is a matter of 
statutory law.”); Sivik v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Div., 231 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Or. Ct. App. 
2010) (“The community caretaking statute is not an exception to the warrant requirement. It is the 
statutory expression of the well-settled precept that the actions of law enforcement officers, like all 
other government actors’ actions, must be traceable to some grant of authority from a politically 
accountable body.” (citations omitted)). 
 214.  United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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ulterior motives—that is, hidden purposes police harbor when they make 
arrests that are objectively backed by probable cause.  The aspiration of 
the prosecution principle in this regard can be understood as the 
minimization of “pretextual” arrests.215 
1.   The Problem of Pretextual Arrests 
Several jurisprudential features reflect the special status of arrests in 
the arsenal of law enforcement.  One can consent to a search, which 
allows the police access to otherwise protected interests without requisite 
legal justification, implying that police can search for a broader set of 
purposes than a well-founded expectation of evidence.216  One can also 
consent to a temporary seizure of oneself, which transforms a seizure 
into a consensual encounter that requires no suspicion.  But one cannot 
consent to one’s own formal custodial arrest without probable cause.  
One could, of course, consent to come to the station;217 ultimately, 
however, if police wish to effectuate a formal arrest, consent will not 
make it lawful without probable cause.  Likewise, the interests 
implicated by searches, seizures of property, and even brief seizures of 
persons, are subject to intrusion as a result of third-party consent.218  By 
contrast, a third party’s consent does not vitiate the requirement that an 
arrest be backed by probable cause.219 
                                                          
 
 215.  Pretext has been variously defined by courts and commentators.  Sometimes, it is defined 
in terms of a specific subset of ulterior motives: “[A] pretextual arrest occurs when the police 
employ an arrest based on probable cause as a device to investigate or search for evidence of an 
unrelated offense for which probable cause is lacking.”  United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 
(7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), abrogated in part by Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).  
Other times, it is defined in terms of any ulterior motives: “[A] so-called ‘pretext’ arrest” occurs 
when “an officer has probable cause to make an arrest because the officer has observed a violation, 
albeit a minor one for which the officer probably would not have made an arrest had there not 
existed some motivation beyond the observed offense.”  United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 785 
(2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  For the purposes of this discussion, I 
adopt the latter, broader conception of pretext. 
 216.  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(a) (3d ed. 2000). 
 217.  E.g., Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 243 (2011) (appellant was not seized because his visit to 
the station was found to be voluntarily or consensual). 
 218.  See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 216, at § 3.10(d). 
 219.  For example, in United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2000), the court held 
that a “passenger may be briefly detained” as a result of the taxi driver’s consent to the stop.  The 
court emphasized that the stop was reasonable because it was a “modest intrusion on passengers’ 
liberty” and cautioned that “this does not mean that a taxicab passenger assumes the risk of every 
type of seizure.”  Id. at 11–12. 
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These features seem to require a closer relationship between the 
“hypothecated”220 reasons that justify arrests and the actual purposes 
pursued by police.  That means that pretext is a bigger normative 
problem for arrests than for other police activities of constitutional 
significance.221  Thus, a variety of doctrinal vehicles have historically 
been deployed by the courts in attempts to constrain pretextual arrests.  
The vagueness doctrine and the now mostly abandoned “pretext 
doctrine” under the Fourth Amendment constituted such attempts.  This 
jurisprudence is familiar ground; here I aim only to bring out the ways in 
which it evoked the prosecution principle as the standard relative to 
which police conduct is assessed. 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation on vagueness grounds of laws 
criminalizing vagrancy, loitering, and breaches of peace since the 1970s 
revealed the Court’s disapproval of pretextual arrests.222  Vague laws are 
constitutionally objectionable in part for notice reasons, and in part on 
account of unfettered enforcement discretion.223  As Debra Livingston 
recounts, critics cited evidence that vagrancy statutes were used “to 
detain classes of people during conventions [and] elections . . . ; to break 
strikes; to ‘round up’ ostensible suspects . . . when a crime had been 
committed,”224  as well as “against participants in peaceful sit-ins and 
civil rights demonstrations in the South.”225  And vague laws enabled 
police to harass people selectively based on race and class.226 
                                                          
 
 220.  Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
 221.  With the possible exception of entry into the home, which courts also regard as requiring 
heightened protection.  See, e.g., Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 556 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citing circuits which have refused to extend the community caretaking exception to searches of the 
home). 
 222.  The challenges to these broad and indefinite prohibitions were partly prompted by 
scholarly criticism of the discriminatory misuses of discretion enabled by the laws.  See Debra 
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and 
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 557–58 (1997). 
 223.  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (“Although the doctrine focuses both on 
actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more 
important aspect . . . [is] ‘the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement.’” (citation omitted)).  For an account of the link between vagueness and 
discriminatory use of discretion, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 214–18 (1985). 
 224.  Livingston, supra note 222, at 596. 
 225.  Id. at 598. 
 226.  See, e.g., William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13 
(1960) (“The persons arrested on ‘suspicion’ are not the sons of bankers, industrialists, lawyers, or 
other professional people.  They, like the people accused of vagrancy, come from other strata of 
society, or from minority groups who are not sufficiently vocal to protect themselves.”). 
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In Papachristou227 and Kolender,228 the Court echoed these concerns.  
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Papachristou contrasted American arrest 
authority with Russia’s, writing that arrests “on suspicion,” “for 
investigation,” or on basis of “past” or “future criminality” are “foreign 
to our system.”229  That included arrests made because the police suspect 
a person of a particular other crime; arrests made to pursue “general law 
enforcement objectives of investigating and preventing unspecified 
crimes”;230 and arrests made to nip crime “in the bud.”231  “States may 
not authorize the arrest and criminal prosecution of an individual” under 
vague statutes for the ulterior purposes of “facilitat[ing] the general law 
enforcement objectives of investigating and preventing unspecified 
crimes.”232  Moreover, vague laws “encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”233  Selectively focusing the power of arrest 
on “particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure”234 or pursuing 
“personal predilections”235 is presented by the Court as a clear misuse of 
the discretionary arrest power.236 
Although the Court does not use the term, an objectionable feature of 
such arrests is their pretextual nature.  In Justice Douglas’s words, “[a] 
vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a conviction which 
could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the 
                                                          
 
 227.  Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972) (invalidating a Jacksonville 
ordinance criminalizing the status of “rogues and vagabonds,” “common drunkards,” “pilferers,” 
“common railers and brawlers,” and “habitual loafers,” among many others). 
 228.  Kolender involved a challenge to a statute that “requires persons who loiter or wander on 
the streets to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification and to account for their presence when 
requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of 
Terry v. Ohio.”  461 U.S. at 352. 
 229.  Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168–69. 
 230.  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 231.  Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171. 
 232.  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 233.  Id. at 357; see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 616 (1971) 
(invalidating a law making it criminal for “three or more persons to assemble” and “conduct 
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by” because it is “an obvious invitation to 
discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is ‘annoying’ because their 
ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow 
citizens.”). 
 234.  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360. 
 235.  Id. at 357–60 (citations omitted). 
 236.  See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(identifying the problem with the vagrancy laws in terms of the ability of the police to focus on 
“men . . . who are vaguely undesirable in the[ir] eyes,” but not “chargeable with any particular 
offense.”). 
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arrest.”237  The pretext afforded by vagrancy laws happens to be 
particularly flimsy and slippery due to the lack of “ascertainable 
standards of guilt.”238  However, one must suspect strongly that the 
“real,” illegitimate grounds for arrests surveyed by the Court would be 
objectionable even if the pretext were stronger, such as that provided by 
a non-vague law.  Indeed, according to scholars such as Livingston, “the 
Court’s judgment in Papachristou was not about vagueness at all,” but 
was primarily an indictment of the purposes to which police put the 
vagrancy law.239  And, as it turns out, the unfettered-discretion-based 
objections to vague laws apply to specific laws as well: as several 
scholars have argued, police can and do act for all the same improper 
reasons when the criminal laws are specific, but broad and 
overlapping.240 
2.   The Fourth Amendment and the Prosecution Principle 
If the vagueness cases convey disapproval of covert ulterior motives, 
one might think that modern Fourth Amendment law has embraced such 
motives and abandoned the prosecution principle.241  Over the past two 
decades or so, it became increasingly clear that arbitrariness and 
improper motives will rarely run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  In 
Whren, the Supreme Court confirmed that an “officer’s motive” does not 
“invalidate[] objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment.”242  In Atwater, the Court upheld police authority to arrest 
                                                          
 
 237.  Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169–70 (1972). 
 238.  Id. at 165. 
 239.  Livingston, supra note 222, at 604–05; see also David Thacher, Order Maintenance 
Policing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING 122, 127 (Michael Reisig and 
Robert Kane, eds., 2014) (arguing that “one motivation” for striking down vagrancy laws “was 
precisely to rein in the pretextual use of order maintenance authority.”). 
 240.  E.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1978 (2008) 
(“Legislators can define broad crimes as specifically as narrow ones, and thereby create as much 
enforcement discretion as they wish without violating the void-for-vagueness doctrine”); Thacher, 
supra note 239, at 123 (“[P]retextual uses of public order law continue today, as many cities 
encourage police to enforce public drinking and loitering rules not out of any intrinsic concern about 
the behaviors they regulate but to give police more opportunity to search for guns and fugitives.”). 
 241.  See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness 
Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 401 (2001) (comparing vagueness and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and concluding that “the Court is clearly of two minds regarding the Constitution’s 
tolerance for police discretion”). 
 242.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).  Even before the Supreme Court made 
explicit that Whren applies to arrests, as well as a traffic stop in Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 
(2001), federal courts have understood it to apply broadly.  See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 110 
F.3d 612, 613–14 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Although Whren specifically concerned a traffic stop, we believe 
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for any criminal offense, no matter how minor.243  And in Devenpeck v. 
Alford, the Court rejected the rule that “the offense establishing probable 
cause must be ‘closely related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the 
offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.”244  These 
cases make it plain that whatever vitality the prosecution principle 
retains, its violation has no Fourth Amendment consequences. 
In advance of these cases however, lower courts implicitly invoked 
the aspiration of the prosecution principle.  Courts “plumb[ed] the 
minds” of police for “impure plots,”245 identifying circumstances when 
“improper,”246 “impermissible,” 247and “illegitimate motives,”248 or 
“invalid purpose[s]” or “subterfuge”249 vitiate an otherwise lawful action.  
Courts that adopted some pretext doctrine concluded that “[a]n arrest 
ostensibly for one purpose but in reality for the primary purpose of 
furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable.”250  Accordingly, courts 
sought to craft standards to weed out the arrests most influenced by these 
ulterior considerations.  Most commonly, police were pursuing 
investigative aims relating to crimes other than those that justified the 
seizure, including hunting for evidence,251 seeking to question the 
suspect,252 or acting on a vague suspicion of criminality.253  Courts have 
disapproved of pretextual seizures executed to identify immigration 
violators.254  And courts have described a variety of considerations as 
improper: relying on race, ethnicity or a race-based profile,255 focusing 
                                                          
 
that its principle is applicable to all police activities for which probable cause is required.”); see also 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 
 243.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 244.  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). 
 245.  Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968). 
 246.  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708–09 (11th Cir. 1986); Marquart v. 
Comm’r. Internal Revenue, No. 99-70046, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9955, at *3–4 (9th Cir. May 9, 
2000); State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Minn. 1992). 
 247.  United States v. Uriostegui, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 248.  See, e.g., People v. Hill, 929 P.2d 735, 740 (Col. 1996). 
 249.  Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 250.  Warren v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 816 F.2d 1254, 1257–58 (8th Cir.1987), on reh’g, 864 
F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 251.  See United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Taglavore, 291 
F.2d at 265); United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
 252.  Warren, 816 F.2d at 1257; United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1451 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 253.  See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by 
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 
(11th Cir. 1987). 
 254.  E.g., United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535, 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled by United 
States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 255.  United States v. Reeves, 798 F. Supp. 1459, 1463–64 (E.D. Wash. 1992), aff’d, 6 F.3d 660 
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on generally “suspicious” people, people with an “unorthodox 
appearance,” or “out-of-state license plates.”256  All these cases convey a 
clear sense that courts disapproved of arrests on bases unrelated to the 
interest in charging arrestees for the behavior that provided probable 
cause.  And while courts do not always treat arrests as different from 
lesser seizures, a few courts have suggested that the case for constraining 
pretextual action is more compelling for arrests than for lesser 
intrusions.257 
Likewise, pre-Devenpeck cases explained the need for the “related 
offense” limitation on valid arrests to discourage “sham arrests”258 made 
on the same improper grounds.  Allowing officers to retrospectively find 
probable cause would “permit an arrest that was a sham or fraud at the 
outset, really unrelated to the crime for which probable cause to arrest 
was actually present to be retroactively validated.”259 
Mixed motives are surely the rule, rather than the exception.  In view 
of this, courts have sought only to mitigate, rather than wholly root out, 
the influence of improper motives.  Thus, courts have targeted those 
instances where improper reasons dominated over proper ones: where, 
for example, the improper motivation was “primary purpose,”260 or 
instances where the arrest would not be made “but for” the improper 
motivation.261  In other words, the arrest was not a misuse of discretion 
                                                          
 
(9th Cir. 1993); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990). 
 256.  E.g., State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also United States v. 
Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 785–86 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring) (declining to adopt a robust 
pretext doctrine, but noting that using pretext to “harass members of groups” on the basis of “race or 
ethnic origin, or simply appearances that some police officers do not like, such as young men with 
long hair, heavy jewelry, and flashy clothing” is “impermissible”). 
 257.  See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 652 n.1 (2002) (“Our cases have not equated 
pretextual stops with pretextual arrests due to the different level of police intrusion involved . . . . 
The intrusiveness of an arrest warrants inquiry into an officer’s subjective intentions.”); Fertig v. 
State, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006) (accepting Whren for purposes of traffic stops, but noting “a 
significant distinction between investigative detentions and arrests”). 
 258.  Biddle v. Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 676–77 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[The related offense rule] 
strike[s] a balance which allows the arresting officer to choose which crime she will charge without 
having to charge every single offense sustainable on the facts, and yet does not ‘open [ ] the door to 
the ‘extrapolation’ of offenses in an effort to justify a sham arrest.’” (citation omitted)). 
 259.  United States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 260.  United States v. Reeves, 798 F. Supp. 1459, 1464 (E.D. Wash. 1992), aff’d, 6 F.3d 660 (9th 
Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (“whether an arrest 
is a mere pretext to search turns on the motivation or primary purpose of the arresting officers”). 
 261.  E.g., State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), opinion adopted, 273 
So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1972) (“The real evil . . . is not that the arrest is a pretext for the search, but that the 
arrest is one which would not have been made but for the motive of the arresting officer.”); Diggs v. 
State, 345 So. 2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977) (question is “whether the arrest was one which would not 
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insofar as it is made primarily for the right reasons.  Significantly, even 
courts that upheld actions taken in part for some ulterior motive did not 
go so far as to actually justify police actions as a normative matter.  For 
example, one court adopting a Whren-like objective approach explained 
that “an arrest . . . is lawful even if the officer making the arrest . . . based 
his or her action on the wrong ground or had an improper motive.”262  
Judges were not willing to concede, in other words, that every lawful 
arrest represented a proper use of discretion. 
The Whren and Atwater decisions were met with a storm of 
criticism.263  Some scholars argue that these decisions are bad law.264  
The critics may well have the better argument.  But there is little reason 
to think that the Supreme Court discarded the normative underpinnings 
of the principles it rejected as a doctrinal matter.  This line of cases 
cannot be fairly read to say that it is a matter of indifference how the 
discretionary authority to arrest is exercised. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions must be evaluated against a 
background assumption that there is a difference between “the abstract 
propriety of the police conduct”265 and the propriety of applying a 
particular constitutionally-based remedy.  Even as these cases affirmed 
broad police discretion, they conveyed disapproval of the seizures at 
issue there.  The Court described the arrest in Atwater as “foolish,” a 
“pointless indignity,” and “gratuitous humiliation[] imposed by a police 
officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.”266  And 
                                                          
 
have been made but for some other [ulterior] motive of the arresting officer.”); United States v. 
Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir. 1986) (a seizure “was unreasonable not because the officer 
secretly hoped to find evidence of a greater offense, but because it was clear that an officer would 
have been uninterested in pursuing the lesser offense absent that hope.”). 
 262.  State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted); see also United 
States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993) (“while we do not applaud what appears to be 
a common practice of some law enforcement officers to use technical violations as a cover for 
exploring for more serious violations, we may look no further than the court’s finding that Trooper 
Washington had a legitimate basis for stopping the van.  We thus must conclude that the stop did not 
violate the fourth amendment.”). 
 263.  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 37, at 549; Maclin, supra note 241. 
 264.  Critics argue that at least for subsets of arrests, probable cause itself is an insufficient 
constraint against the abuse of authority.  See Joshua Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional 
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 992 
(2014) (arrests ought to be reasonable in addition to backed by probable cause); Sekhon, supra note 
38 (probable cause insufficient for crimes subject to “proactive policing”); Barbara C. Salken, The 
General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion 
to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 224 (1989) (probable cause insufficient for 
traffic offenses). 
 265.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). 
 266.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001). 
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the court acknowledges in Whren that even intentional enforcement on 
the basis of race would fall outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibitions.267  In Devenpeck, the Court does not deny that its holding 
protects arrests made by officers for “the wrong reason,”268 but claims 
that the contrary rule would not reduce the incidence of such “sham 
arrests.”269  As three Justices would have had the Court hold decades 
earlier, “we might wish that policemen would not act with impure plots 
in mind,” but the presence of such plots is not “a sufficient basis for 
excluding [evidence], in the supposed service of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . .”270  These are cases where practical considerations of 
efficacy and courts’ limited capacity for discerning police motives271 
trump the normative pull of the prosecution principle.272 
   Indeed, after Whren, many courts describe that case’s holding as 
divorcing the illegitimacy of actual motives from legality, explaining that 
they “may not inquire into whether the officer’s behavior had improper 
motives.”273  What they do not say is that any motive is normatively 
                                                          
 
 267.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We of course agree with petitioners 
that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.  
But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 268.  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004). 
 269.  Id. at 155. 
 270.  Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968). 
 271.  Sorting among the multitude of mixed motives behind police actions is not a task to be 
undertaken lightly.  See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) (the 
concern about “unfettered police discretion” has to be balanced against the problem that “‘[a]n 
examination of a police officer’s subjective intent in individual cases would unwisely involve the 
courts in unproductive inquiries . . . [since] courts cannot with any degree of regularity determine 
when there existed an improper motive that influenced the police conduct.’”).  The Devenpeck Court 
rejected the related offense limitation on another practical ground: it would not ensure that “officers 
will cease making sham arrests on the hope that such arrests will later be validated, but rather that 
officers will cease providing reasons for arrest” or “would simply give every reason for which 
probable cause could conceivably exist.”  543 U.S. at 155. 
 272.  Even as a proponent of the prosecution principle, LaFave observed that the fact of police 
arrests “for purposes other than the sole legitimate objective” does not mean that the answer is “to 
use the exclusionary rule as a blunderbuss.”  LaFave, supra note 192, at 62; see also Thomas R. 
Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 321, 330 (1979) (“[O]ne approach to th[e] [pretext] problem is to attack it head on . . . 
[and] exclude evidence upon a showing that an arrest was only ‘a pretext to search for evidence.’  
Given the difficulty of determining police motivation, however, the effectiveness of this solution is 
doubtful.”). 
 273.  See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1996) (Whren 
precluded inquiry “into whether the officer’s behavior had improper motives”); Artiles v. Vitanza, 
No. 06–5427 (KSH), 2009 WL 2426259, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2009) (same); People v. Hill, 929 
P.2d 735, 740 (Col. 1996) (same); see also Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“Improper motive, however, is irrelevant to the question whether the objective facts available 
to the officers.”). 
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acceptable so long as there is an objective legally sufficient justification.  
Courts are occasionally explicit that adhering to Whren leaves police 
abuse of its authority without redress.  In a case where an officer was 
almost certainly motivated by the desire to verify a driver’s immigration 
status, the court stated that when “an officer’s suspicion . . . is raised 
solely as a result of a driver’s ethnicity or race . . . Whren could enlist the 
judiciary as an accomplice . . . to race or ethnicity-based police 
actions . . . [which] would pose a serious challenge to our nation’s 
claimed commitment to a blind, non-racial criminal justice system.”274  
One would be hard-pressed to find an opinion, in which a court speaks 
with approval about the police’s use of their discretion to make arrests 
for these common ulterior reasons.  And, some state courts, undeterred 
by the practical difficulties of pretext doctrine, have explicitly rejected 
the Whren doctrine, and continue to screen out pretext arrests under their 
state constitutions’ guarantee against unreasonable seizures.275  The 
aspiration of the prosecution principle—to minimize pretextual arrests—
thus remains discernible in judicial discourse. 
D.  Collateral Incentives and the Significance of Explicit Statutory 
Authorization 
If the prosecution principle remains the dominant standard that 
defines what it means to use and misuse the discretion to arrest, then 
collateral incentives are unambiguously incentives to misuse that 
discretion.  The Terry division of labor implies that arrests made 
explicitly and solely for these collateral purposes are inappropriate.  And 
arrests made primarily for the sake of collateral benefits, even if 
explicitly for the proper purpose, differ little from those of which courts 
disapproved in vagueness and pretext cases. 
Accepting this claim does not require an assumption that the 
prosecution principle is the eternal lodestar for arrests.  It is, after all, not 
                                                          
 
 274.  United States v. Uriostegui, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262–63 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 275.  See, e.g., State v. Ochoa, 146 N.M. 32, 37, 44–45 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (invalidating 
pretextual traffic stops under the state constitution); State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 652 (2002) 
(“Unlike the United States Supreme Court, this court has considered pretextual arrests to be 
unreasonable for over twenty years”); State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 358 (1999)  (“Whren does 
not define or limit our rights under independent state constitutional safeguards.”); State v. Heath, 
929 A.2d 390, 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (rejecting Whren on state constitutional grounds); cf. 
Fertig v. State, 146 P.3d 492, 501 n.3 (Wyo. 2006) (accepting Whren for traffic stops, but noting “a 
significant distinction between investigative detentions and arrests,” and disavowing “inten[t] to 
change what w[as] previously stated about pretextual arrests”). 
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“the law.”  There is little reason to doubt that the democratic process may 
broaden the purposes, which the coercive power to arrest may serve, 
within constitutional limits.  I suggest merely that the principle is the 
default in absence of explicit legislative authorization for pursuing other 
public aims by means of arrests.  The question of which state actors have 
the authority to revise traditional common law principles limiting the use 
of state coercion may not have a simple answer.  Nonetheless, the case 
for explicit, transparent revision by democratically accountable state 
legislatures—over the incidental byproducts of legislation or federal 
agency directives—is compelling.  Federal agency policies that 
incidentally affect arrest decisions are particularly problematic.  Policing 
and crime control are consistently identified as a paradigmatic example 
of “what is truly local,”276 both as a legal and practical matter.  As Dan 
Richman points out, “[e]verybody knows to call the local police when 
reporting or complaining about . . . crime.”277  “With this responsibility 
comes at least the potential for some institutional accountability at the 
local level.”278  As Rachel Harmon shows, federal programs that rely on 
local law enforcement distort the ordinary mechanisms for that 
accountability.279  While the creation of collateral incentives may not run 
afoul of the constitutional rules, it is certainly in tension with the 
federalist preference to leave the police power to state control.280  In 
tension with the incentives set up by Secure Communities, Oregon law, 
for example, prohibits state law enforcement from using agency 
“moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or 
apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are 
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of 
federal immigration laws.”281  Some of the LEAs that express approval 
for automated immigration screening are in states whose political 
branches express opposition to the program.282  The fact that department-
                                                          
 
 276.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
 277.  Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & 
JUST. 377, 378 (2006). 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Rachel Harmon, Federal Public Safety Programs and the Real Costs of Policing (July 14, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 280.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police 
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the 
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.” (citations omitted)). 
 281.  OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2007). 
 282.  For example, the Sheriff of Yates County, NY, a Board Member of the National Sheriffs’ 
Association, signed on to the Association’s approval of Secure Communities, see Nat’l Sheriffs’ 
Ass’n, supra note 118, while Governor Cuomo has publicly opposed the program and sought 
 
614 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
level preferences are paramount in encouraging, tolerating, or 
disciplining individual officers’ use of arrest discretion means that it is 
local, departmental preferences that will determine whether or not the 
state-level preference is reflected on the ground.283 
State laws that obliquely affect the purposes for which arrests are 
made are also problematic, though perhaps less so than federal 
initiatives.  Explicit legislative authorization may legitimately expand 
arrest authority to purposes beyond those justifying the arrest power as a 
matter of historical norms.  As noted throughout, legislatures have indeed 
responded to the demands of modernity by authorizing arrests for 
purposes other than prosecution.  Statutes authorize warrantless arrests of 
the mentally ill as well as to prevent suicide.284  Statutes authorize 
temporary preventive custody of intoxicated persons, sometimes 
specifying that such detentions shall not be deemed arrests.285  Federal 
and state laws authorize the arrest of material witnesses, if their 
testimony cannot be otherwise secured.286  In addition, legislatures can 
authorize arrest for conduct that previously could not be criminally 
prosecuted by creating new crimes.  When many vagrancy and loitering 
laws were declared unconstitutional, legislatures were able to allow 
police to make effectively many of the same arrests by creating more 
specific public-order crimes.287  Such intentional and transparent 
legislative broadening of the purposes of arrests is plausibly the result of 
                                                          
 
unsuccessfully to keep New York from participation.  See Letter from Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to 
Governor Cuomo, to John Sandweg, Counselor to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf. 
 283.  Indeed, much of the controversy surrounding Secure Communities hinges on its mandatory 
nature, as some states, as well as localities, resented federal interference with the fates of local non-
citizen arrestees.  See, e.g., Elise Foley, Obama Faces Growing Rebellion Against The Secure 
Communities Deportation Program, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2014, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/24/secure-communities_n_5182876.html (describing some 
state and local measures to thwart Secure Communities). 
 284.  E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103 (West Supp. 2014) (arrest for suicide prevention); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 2014) (authorizing taking into custody of a person who “as 
a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely 
disabled” for “up to 72 hours” in a designated facility). 
 285.  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111B, § 8 (West 2003) (authorizing protective custody of 
intoxicated persons for up to 12 hours and noting that such persons “shall not be considered to have 
been arrested or to have been charged with any crime”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 172-B:3 (2014) 
(same for up to 24 hours, and stating that “protective custody under this section is not an arrest”). 
 286.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1104 (2003). 
 287.  See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 67 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(Although “[a]s the [gang loitering] ordinance comes to this Court, it is unconstitutionally vague,” 
there “remain open to Chicago reasonable alternatives to combat the very real threat posed by gang 
intimidation” by means of more specific laws.). 
2015] COLLATERAL INCENTIVES TO ARREST 615 
a conscious democratic decision to use arrests to advance new purposes.  
By contrast, instituting screening regimes that on their face disavow 
intentions to affect arrest decisions are not likely a result of a transparent 
deliberation about the legitimate uses of the arrest power.288  Collateral 
incentives are problematic, in short, because they commandeer all the 
coercive authority that police wield in ordinary arrests towards ends, for 
the sake of which a democratically-accountable body might not authorize 
the use of force. 
IV.  THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF COLLATERAL INCENTIVES 
Part III suggests that collateral incentives are problematic as a 
normative matter because they invite police to misuse the authority to 
arrest.  The practical consequences of such incentives entail the 
distortion of arrest patterns.  This Part turns from jurisprudential 
background principles to explore these consequences and flesh out the 
empirical expectations about the effects of collateral incentives on arrest 
patterns. 
As the definition offered in Part II suggests, collateral incentives are 
incentives to arrest on bases unrelated to arrest quality, and should thus 
be expected to have an adverse effect on quality at least on some 
occasions.  Moreover, collateral incentives could also be expected to 
have a redistributive effect on the pool of arrestees.  Just as police may 
make more arrests of members of an identifiable demographic group 
perceived to exhibit higher rates of offending,289 they may be expected to 
“favor” the group that promises higher expected extrinsic benefits.290  As 
Albert Altschuler puts it with regard to statistical discrimination, “[a] 
trade-off between distributive justice and efficiency,” which for arrests 
corresponds to arrest quality, “seems inescapable.”291  Unlike “pure” 
statistical discrimination, however, collateral incentives do not “trade 
off” inequality for arrest quality or vice versa.  Indeed, for a subset of 
arrests, they are likely to result in a compromise with respect to both.292 
                                                          
 
 288.  See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 289.  See supra notes 50–51. 
 290.  See, e.g., Logan, supra note 15, at 1590 (“Trolling and trawling for DNA become even 
more problematic when one takes into account the demographic and geographic effects of arrests.”). 
 291.  Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 
167 (2002). 
 292.  For an exposition that formalizes a similar intuition, see Brian Rowe, Discretion and 
Ulterior Motives in Traffic Stops: The Detection of Other Crimes and the Revenue from Tickets, 
BUREAU OF ECON.: FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2010), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rowebr/ 
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At the same time, the effects on arrest patterns are not uniform or 
unambiguous.  Nor is the misuse of discretion that accompanies 
collateral incentives limited to the universe of cases where discretion is 
most commonly believed to be abused—petty offenses, for which arrests 
are made in the course of proactive street policing.  The following 
sections explain that how precisely collateral incentives shape arrest 
patterns depends on whether law enforcers care about the intrinsic 
benefit of arrests at all, and on the underlying distribution of guilt for 
particular offenses in particular settings. 
A.   Arrests Made for Extrinsic Benefits 
Collateral incentives have the most unambiguous effect on arrest 
quality and the composition of the arrestee pool for that subset of arrests, 
which would simply not be made for the intrinsic benefits of arrests 
alone.  If police are intent on pursuing an extrinsic benefit, be it order 
maintenance or effecting a deportation, they have good reason to seize 
without probable cause and be “willing to forgo successful prosecution in 
the interest of serving some other goal.”293  Such arrests are well-
documented and discussed in scholarship and the media.294  For instance, 
accounts such as Adrian Schoolcraft’s, the New York officer who 
secretly audio-recorded his precinct for months, show that supervisors 
tell officers to “haul someone in with the intent of voiding the arrest at 
the end of a shift,” or “arrest citizens after having witnessed them doing 
nothing more than standing around, just to let them go a few hours later 
with no charges filed.”295  Issa Kohler-Hausmann’s research into New 
York misdemeanors shows “massively expanded arrests for low-level 
                                                          
 
pdfs/rowe_ulteriormotives_apr2010.pdf (employing a model of law enforcement to show that 
seemingly wasteful traffic stops, where no tickets are issued, are rationalized by “the ulterior motive 
of detecting other crimes”). 
 293.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). 
 294.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1348 (2012) (“[B]ulk-
urban policing crimes such as loitering, trespassing, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest . . . 
are . . . the kinds of offenses for which police often use high volume arrests to maintain street order 
or zero tolerance policies . . . . [S]uch arrests routinely occur without sufficient evidence to support 
conviction.”). 
 295.  Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes, Part 2, VILLAGE VOICE (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-05-11/news/nypd-tapes-part-2-bed-stuy/; see also Bielevicz v. 
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 849 (3d Cir. 1990) (“it was common knowledge among officers that the 
charge of public drunkenness could be used to remove from the streets without probable cause a 
person who was not intoxicated . . . . [T]he charge was often used to defuse crowd control problems, 
to detain people found in areas of notorious drug use, to arrest women suspected of prostitution, and 
to punish anyone who defiantly quarreled with an officer.”). 
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crimes [since the 1990s] . . . [which] did not translate into 
proportionately higher numbers or rates of misdemeanor convictions.”296  
Unlawful arrests for the sake of the collateral benefit have in fact been 
brought before the courts,297 and reported by practitioners.298  For 
instance, the DOJ investigation of the Maricopa County’s Sheriff’s 
Office (MCSO) under the notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio found that, 
among other transgressions, MCSO deputies were found to “arrest Latino 
drivers . . . without . . . adequate cause” to enforce immigration law.299  
While these sorts of arrests have been documented most commonly for 
petty crimes, there have been cases of arrests made for the sake of the 
collateral benefit for more serious crimes.300  In short, when police 
wholly discount the intrinsic benefits of arrests and pursue collateral 
benefits, the effect will be to both lower arrest quality and redistribute 
the pool of arrestees towards identifiable groups perceived more likely to 
deliver the latter benefit. 
B. Arrests for Common Offenses with Clear Probability of Guilt 
Even if police are not wholly indifferent to the core purpose of 
arrests, however, collateral incentives will affect decisions on the 
margins. Assume an officer who does value the intrinsic benefits of 
arrest.  Suppose that officer’s “arrest threshold” requires a 50% chance of 
                                                          
 
 296.  Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 641–42 (2014). 
 297.  E.g., United States v. Morales-Puerto, No. 06-30452, 2007 WL 1454953, at *1 (9th Cir. 
May 16, 2007) (defendant was arrested because police recognized his photo from a circulated non-
criminal immigration warrant, and defendant was promptly handed over to ICE custody, and where 
“[t]he government no longer disputes that . . . there was neither probable cause nor a warrant” for the 
arrest). 
 298.  See Alex Stepick et al., False Promises: The Failure of Secure Communities in Miami-
Dade County, RESEARCH INST. ON SOC. & ECON. POLICY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH & STUDIES, 
FLA. INT’L UNIV., 9 (Apr. 2013), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aijustice/pages/283/ 
attachments/original/1390429692/False-Promises-The-Failure-of-Secure-Communities-in-Miami-
Dade-County.pdf?1390429692 (a public defender in Miami-Dade County reported the increase in 
arrests of Hispanics “for charges we would not normally see,” such as “trespassing for sitting on a 
bus bench,” and of which “many are dismissed outright”). 
 299.  Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. 
Attorney, Maricopa Cnty. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ 
mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.  The MCSO became involved in immigration enforcement before 
Secure Communities as part of a 287(g) agreement, and contacting ICE on their own initiative. 
 300.  See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Partida, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1068 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(defendant was illegally searched and arrested on cocaine and heroin possession charges after 
detective saw his Mexican driver’s license, actions which were, as the court found, “in part 
motivated by an immigration-related purpose” because the detective knew defendant would be 
fingerprinted and his immigration status screened pursuant to current policy). 
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legal guilt: that is, his decision rule is to make arrests only when he 
assess the probability of guilt at 50% or above, which makes the 
existence of probable cause reasonably likely. 
With that officer in mind, consider a set of offenses, where offenders 
are common and signals of guilt are readily apparent.  Most traffic 
violations are of this kind.  It is commonplace to observe that a law 
enforcer who is so inclined would be able to stop and arrest just about 
any motorist for an observed violation, because violations are so 
common.  In such contexts, the probability of guilt is distributed across 
the locally policed population (i.e., drivers on the road, people out in 
public in a patrolled area) as depicted in Figure 1.  Some people display 
no signs of violating the law, but those who do, not only demonstrate 
some signals of guilt, but the signals are unambiguous and clearly over 
our hypothetical officer’s arrest threshold (represented by the solid line). 
In such settings, where sufficiently guilty targets are plentiful, police 
can effectively determine arrest rates and the total number of arrests.  
The expected intrinsic value and cost of such an arrest does not vary 
much across potential arrestees.301  An expectation of a positive extrinsic 
benefit thus endows an arrest with a higher value to the arresting officer.  
This has an effect of moving the officer’s decision threshold for making 
an arrest to some probability of guilt below 50% (i.e., 50% - b, 
represented by the dotted line) for the sub-population for which the 
benefit is expected, since arrests of “less guilty” individuals are worth the 
same with the expected benefit as the arrests of the “more guilty” without 
it.  And, this means that of two potential “equally guilty” suspects, the 









                                                          
 
 301.  That is, I presume for the sake of this discussion, that all “traffic offenses” are viewed as of 
equivalent seriousness or arrest-worthiness by law enforcers; this is clearly not true as a descriptive 
matter, but the inferences remain applicable if we instead imagine several categories of equivalent 
offenses.  The equivalence of costs across all traffic offenses is a more realistic assumption in the 
sense that the officer need not expend more effort into investigating or effecting one arrest or 
another. 













Figure 1. Probability of guilt across the locally policed population. 
 
    officer’s arrest threshold without collateral benefit 
--- officer’s arrest threshold with the collateral benefit 
 
While no other class of violations is as common as traffic violations, 
all that is required for this decision environment is that offenders are 
numerous, easily found, and that signals of guilt be manifest.  For 
instance, in areas where drug dealing is widespread, arrests for retail 
drug sale may present police with similar decisions.  To be sure, 
observing a drug sale directly requires more effort from law enforcers 
than observing a traffic violation.  The effort, however, is roughly the 
same across the many potential targets.  Buy-bust tactics in a setting with 
many potential targets leaves police free choice of who to target, as 
Sekhon’s account of narcotics policing in Seattle shows.302 
Although some scholars express concern that common, petty crimes 
are “evidentiarily weak,”303 selective arrests for these kinds of common 
crimes need not be weaker than arrests made in the absence of an ulterior 
purpose.  Because the rise in the probability of guilt is steep across the 
policed population, there are not a lot of suspects whose likelihood of 
guilt is in between the officer’s original decision threshold and his 
                                                          
 
 302.  Sekhon, supra note 38, at 1200–03 (describing how the Seattle Police Department’s 
enforcement policies produce disproportionately high rates of arrests of African-American sellers, 
relative to their likely share of all drug sellers in the city); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 
296, at 630 (listing a number of crimes such as drug possession and unlicensed vending of which 
“[t]he police can find as many instances . . . as they devote the time and resources to find”). 
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extrinsic-benefit threshold.304  In this setting, collateral benefits allow 
police to make a higher value arrest at a fixed cost.  The problem is as 
Sekhon puts it, “distinguishing among the guilty,”305 where degrees of 
guilt need not be traded off against collateral benefits.  Thus, the 
predominant effect of collateral incentives for such offenses is to 
redistribute arrests towards groups expected to deliver the benefit. 
There is some evidence that collateral incentives affected these sorts 
of arrests.  The DOJ found, for instance, that Alamance County’s Sheriff 
Terry Johnson directed officers “to arrest all Latinos who commit the 
traffic infraction of driving without a license,” in order to “bring them 
into the Alamance County Jail to be run through immigration databases, 
rather than simply issuing them citations.”306  The Latinos so detained 
were as guilty as non-Latinos arrested for the same offense.  The effect 
of collateral incentives is instead predominantly on relative group-
specific arrest rates.307 
C. Arrests for Offenses on Ambiguous Evidence 
For many ordinary offenses, however, manifestly guilty individuals 
are not as common, and the probability of guilt for a given offense 
declines across the policed population, as depicted in Figure 2.  In many 
settings, the probability of guilt will be ambiguous, even if the offense 
itself is relatively common.  Some such offenses are encountered in the 
course of proactive policing, while some come to the attention of the 






                                                          
 
 304.  That is, the area under the probability-of-guilt curve between a 50% probability of guilt and 
some lower probability of guilt, .5-b, which delivers the same benefit when combined with a chance 
to obtain the extrinsic benefit, is small. 
 305.  Sekhon, supra note 38, at 1172. 
 306.  Thomas E. Perez, United States’ Investigation of the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 6 (Sept. 18 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
171201291812462488198.pdf. 
 307.  Latino drivers were arrested disproportionately often in Alamance County, as shown by the 
expert analysis ordered by the DOJ.  See John H. MacDonald, Expert Report on The Alamance 
County Sheriff’s Office (Nov. 15, 2013), http://ncids.com/pd-core/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/05/Expert-Report-on-the-Alamance-County-Sheriffs-Department-John-M-MacDonald.pdf. 














Figure 2. Probability of guilt across the locally policed 
population. 
 
    officer’s arrest threshold without collateral benefit 
 --- officer’s arrest threshold with the collateral benefit 
 
Consider this ordinary set of cases.  Acting on an informant’s report, 
police observe behavior consistent with a drug transaction, but do not 
directly observe drugs change hands.308  A call to the police reports a 
physical altercation between two neighbors; police arrive and question 
both men, each of whom blames the other for initiating the fight.309  A 
child makes an allegation of sexual assault against an adult, in the 
absence of physical evidence.310  A police officer asking an individual for 
identification is handed an unfamiliar identification card, where 
possession of a false document with intent to defraud is a criminal 
offense.311  All of these cases may or may not support probable cause as 
                                                          
 
 308.  See, e.g., MOSKOS, supra note 32, at 130–35 (describing variations on these facts to 
demonstrate that arrests for which he, the arresting officer, believed he had probable cause, were 
declined for prosecution by the prosecutor). 
 309.  For a similar case, see Sheehy v. Town of Plymouth, 191 F.3d 15, 17–18 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 310.  Although victim complaints are said to establish probable cause, courts have noted that this 
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evidence are not uncommon.  See, e.g., Waters v. Clarke, No. 2:11CV00630, 2012 WL 4498916 
(E.D. Va. July 3, 2012). 
 311.  See Eagly, supra note 93, at 1183 (“Defense attorneys in Maricopa County[, AZ,] 
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a matter of law, and a prosecutor may or may not choose to prosecute 
them. 
In all these cases it is not immediately apparent that evidence puts 
the likelihood of guilt beyond the officer’s arrest threshold.  The 
expectation of a collateral benefit would make the officer more likely to 
make an arrest, because it would compensate for the possibility that the 
arrest turns out to be unlawful.  Absent extrinsic benefits, an officer will 
make a judgment and arrest some but not other suspects.  The effect of 
collateral incentives is again to move the officer’s evidentiary threshold 
for arrests below his ordinary threshold (represented by the dotted line) 
for the sub-population for which the benefit is expected.  In this setting, 
arresting on the basis of the collateral benefit allows police to make 
arrests of equal value as those of suspects above the arrest threshold at 
the same cost.  By contrast with the offenses depicted in Figure 1, here 
there is a non-trivial number of suspects whose probability of guilt lies 
between the officer’s original decision threshold and his extrinsic-benefit 
threshold, and who may be selected for arrests in the expectation of an 
extrinsic benefit.  Thus, for this category of conduct, the effect of 
collateral incentives will be not only to increase relative arrest rates for 
groups promising the collateral benefit, but also to decrease the quality of 
arrests. 
Reported case law documents instances where it seems highly likely 
that collateral incentives played a role in the decision to arrest on 
ambiguous signals of guilt.  For example, in a case which the court 
characterized as a “close one” on the question of probable cause,312 
detectives arrested a suspect for attempted delivery of a controlled 
substance.  Detectives observed what they thought was drug-related 
contact in an area known for drug dealing, searched the defendant, and 
questioned a passenger in the car, who said she bought heroin from the 
defendant years earlier.  Faced with ambiguous signals of guilt, 
detectives chose to arrest the defendant.  One detective contacted the 
then-INS.  The court found the evidence insufficient for probable cause, 
and determined that the arrest was “based at least in part on [the 
defendant’s] race,” used as an indicator of illegal presence in the 
                                                          
 
during questioning from the police only to be arrested for document fraud because the foreign 
document looks ‘suspicious.’”). 
 312.  United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 575 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although the facts 
make this call a close one, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred when it ruled that 
considering the totality of evidence,” that “the evidence was insufficient to establish probable 
cause”). 
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country.313  The court’s perception was supported by the fact that the 
police did not arrest defendant’s companion, “a non-Hispanic, who failed 
to signal a turn, was driving with a suspended license, and was an 
admitted heroin addict in possession of drug paraphernalia.”314 
Published cases, where courts make confident conclusions about the 
officer’s motivation for the arrest are not frequent.  And legal challenges 
to such arrests are few and far between in the immigration screening 
context: if the officer was correct and the arrestee is placed in deportation 
proceedings, it will usually do him no good to challenge the arrest.315  
Although courts may not see very many such cases, arrests made under 
similar conditions should be entirely expected for those law enforcers 
who value the collateral benefit. 
D. Arrests Requiring Investigative Effort 
When probable cause is not immediately apparent and the set of 
plausible suspects is small (or the suspect is unique), the arrest decision 
may be postponed until further investigation cements or dispels 
suspicion.  The guilt probability curve for this set of crimes also declines 
across the policed population, and more steeply so (Figure 3), with even 
fewer suspects at the high probability-of-guilt end.  Because guilt is not 
readily apparent, these cases require some investigation.  Sometimes 
police focus on a single, identified perpetrator. But arrests are often 
made, and subsequently prosecuted, in cases without strong identifying 







                                                          
 
 313.  United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D. Or. 2003), aff’d in part, 
dismissed in part, 427 F.3d 567, 580 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 314.  Id.; see also Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 775–76 (8th Cir. 2010) (arrest of defendant 
on ambiguous evidence of violating a municipal alcohol ordinance, which was found to lack 
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 315.  See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 316.  See Steven G. Brandl & James Frank, The Relationship between Evidence, Detective Effort, 
and the Disposition of Burglary and Robbery Investigations, in THE POLICE IN AMERICA: CLASSIC 
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 300, 307 (Steven G. Brandl & David E. Barlow, eds., 2004). 













Figure 3. Probability of guilt across the locally policed 
population. 
 
officer’s arrest threshold without collateral benefit 
 --- officer’s arrest threshold with the collateral benefit 
 
These kinds of arrests are typically made in the course of “reactive” 
policing.  There is a measure of scholarly consensus that policing 
described as proactive or preventative is less constrained by the core 
constitutional limits on searches and seizures, but that these limits 
function better when it comes to reactive or investigative policing of 
serious crimes.317  Investigation-heavy felony arrests are thus frequently 
described as non-discretionary.318  Likewise, detectives involved in the 
kinds of serious crimes that require investigation are typically 
characterized as focused on convictions and more susceptible to legal 
                                                          
 
 317.  See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the 
Legitimate Investigative Sphere”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 621 (2006) (“The attempt to limit police 
authority through prospective constitutional (and other) norms that control the police’s ability to 
search, seize, and interrogate suspects is properly confined to the police’s investigative role.  These 
limits do not work well to regulate the police’s authority when engaged in upholding public order 
and preventing crime.”); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too 
Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1852 (2004) (“When it 
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controls.319  The proactive/reactive, or preventive/investigative 
dichotomy should not lead to the sanguine conclusion that collateral 
incentives will not affect this category of arrests. 
For any given crime and any given suspect, police have the choice of 
arresting on existing evidence or continuing to investigate (i.e., incur 
higher costs) with the expectation of increasing the quality of the 
arrest.320  Even detectives working serious cases decide how much effort 
to devote to a case, whether to soft-pedal, and when to stop investigation 
and make an arrest.321  In this context, setting the level of investigative 
effort on the basis of the collateral benefit allows police to make arrests 
of equal value as those of suspects above the arrest threshold at lower 
cost. 
Reported cases document instances where it seems highly likely that 
collateral incentives presented by immigration screening affected 
investigative effort.  In United States v. Bowley,322 a police sergeant was 
investigating a series of armed robberies.  He received information from 
an informant that Bowley was involved in these and additional serious 
crimes.  When in the course of his investigation, the sergeant and his 
partner learned that Bowley was likely illegally in the country, they 
arrested him, rather than continuing to investigate the crimes.323  The 
court later determined that while the police had reasonable suspicion 
with regard to Bowley’s involvement in the robberies, it did not amount 
to probable cause.324  Bowley was suspected of a number of serious 
crimes, of the kind that most officers would presumably value highly and 
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seek to clear.  Nonetheless, once officers learned that he was likely 
deportable, they decided to arrest on what they must have realized was 
not clearly sufficient evidence: they were following a tip by an 
informant, whose veracity and basis of knowledge could not be taken for 
granted.325  Were Bowley a citizen, it seems likely that officers would 
continue his investigation before making an arrest. 
While police probably value the intrinsic benefits of arrests for 
serious crimes that demand investigation, there is evidence that 
extralegal, irrelevant considerations influence investigative effort and 
arrest decisions even for these crimes.  Studies show that extralegal 
factors such as victim’s and offender’s race affects how much 
investigative effort is put into clearing recorded crimes and whether an 
suspect is ultimately arrested.326  Studies likewise suggest that extralegal 
factors affect arrest quality: one study finds that arrests of Black suspects 
are dismissed more often than arrests of White suspects—not only for 
“discretionary” minor crimes, but also for serious violent crimes.327  If 
dismissal rates correlate with arrest quality, these results suggest that 
race influences arrest decisions beyond what is warranted by the 
evidence.  It is then not unreasonable to think that collateral incentives 
could be as influential as other extralegal factors. 
In sum, if we believe that officers maximize arrest value, faced with 
limited resources and numerical pressures, it should be expected that 
collateral incentives influence arrest decisions.  These incentives 
introduce redistributive pressures across all arrests to which they attach 
that are unwarranted by the underlying offense rates.  Furthermore, for 
three categories of arrests—those for which officers are indifferent to 
intrinsic value, those which involve ambiguous guilt, and those that call 
for investigative effort—these incentives conduce to lower arrest quality. 
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E. The Problem of Systematic Evidence 
One might justifiably ask whether collateral incentives are likely to 
matter for more than the handful of cases offered to illustrate the 
plausibility of the expectations above.  Although, as I argue, there are 
good reasons to expect collateral incentives to have real consequences, 
systematic evidence is indeed scarce.  In part, this is because these 
screening regimes are sufficiently recent that a body of robust empirical 
research has not yet accumulated.328  A few studies are suggestive.  An 
analysis of Irving, TX, found that arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses 
increased considerably after a pre-Secure Communities in-jail screening 
regime was implemented in the jurisdiction, which could not be 
reasonably explained by changes in lawless behavior by Hispanics.329  
Another study analyzed a sample of deported immigrants identified 
through Secure Communities, finding that Latinos are overrepresented in 
the sample relative to their share in the estimated unauthorized 
immigrant population, and that the differences cannot be explained by 
their higher criminal activity.330  Yet another study examined the 
language used in traffic arrest reports before and after Davidson County, 
TN, entered into a 287(g) agreement with DHS, and found that country 
of origin, language, and immigration status were significantly more 
likely to occur in reports after the county implemented the immigration-
enforcement partnership.  As these factors are unrelated to probable 
cause, their presence signals greater law enforcement attention to 
immigration status, after such becomes relevant to post-arrest 
outcomes.331  The experiences of Maricopa and Alamance Counties 
Sheriff’s Offices noted above also suggest that access to immigration 
information mattered for those LEAs.332 
More fundamentally, however, subjecting these expectations to 
empirical scrutiny will be a difficult task.  As with anything that 
influences decisions at the margins, the effects of any one set of 
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collateral incentives may be too faint to be detected.  Effects may be 
undiscernible, even if they are not substantively trivial.  New collateral 
incentives layer on top of preexisting incentives, and signals that a 
suspect might deliver one collateral benefit may be correlated with a 
signal of another such benefit—and may reinforce extant demographic 
inequalities in enforcement.  This makes consequences of any single 
policy innovation difficult to detect empirically in a way that allows an 
inference of a causal connection.  For instance, incentives for pretextual 
enforcement actions and targeting of Latinos were already in place for 
some LEAs before the implementation of Secure Communities.  While 
both earlier and later policy innovations may have influenced arrest 
decisions at the margins, the activation of the latter program might not 
trigger clearly discernible, substantial changes in arrest patterns.333  The 
accretion of collateral incentives has the potential to transform 
dramatically who is targeted for arrest and what legal guilt means, 
without our ability to notice the transformation at any particular point in 
time.  Criminal procedure scholars, such as Stephanos Bibas and Eric 
Luna, advocate for transparency, as a way to keep police accountable.334  
Unless transparency can elicit the ulterior motives with which law 
enforcers act, having access to the data of policing may still not allow us 
to detect “statistically insignificant” effects of gradual, multiple 
innovations.  The potential impotence of transparency in this regard 
undermines the force of the Supreme Court’s claim in Atwater that 
“failing” the normal constraints on arrest discretion discussed above, 
there is always  “political accountability[] of most local lawmakers and 
law-enforcement officials.”335 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
Secure Communities and DNA collection laws are not the first 
collateral incentives attached to arrests, nor will they be the last. This 
Article put forth a normative and practical case against an uncritical 
embracing of such policy innovations.  The concern about collateral 
incentives to arrests is a special case of more general concern about the 
way discretion is exercised, expressed by scholars such as David 
Sklansky and Eric Miller, among others.336  Sklansky worries about the 
rise of “ad hoc instrumentalism,” which he defines as “a manner of 
thinking about law and legal institutions that downplays concerns about 
consistency and places little stock in formal legal categories, but instead 
sees legal rules and legal procedures simply as a set of interchangeable 
tools.”337  Ad hoc instrumentalism describes a state of affairs whereby 
state agents choose, on an ad hoc basis, a legal tool at their disposal from 
a menu of criminal and civil sanctions, which they deem the most useful 
means of neutralizing a problematic person.  Attaching collateral 
incentives to arrests invites police to adopt Sklansky’s ad hoc 
instrumentalism when it comes to the most coercive tool at their 
disposal: an arrest may, depending on the officer’s judgment, facilitate 
prosecution—or it may serve to deport a non-citizen, to solve a cold case, 
or to deter individuals from future criminal activity.  Miller’s proposal to 
institutionally separate investigative from preventative, or caretaking 
roles stems from similar concerns about the instrumental use by the 
police of low-level encounters meant for caretaking, to investigate and 
prosecute more serious crimes.338  Only an institutional separation, he 
argues, will remove the constant temptation by the police to “escalate” 
Terry-level encounters into more coercive encounters with serious penal 
consequences.339  To put Miller’s thesis in the terms employed in this 
article, there are no effective means to enforce the Terry division of labor 
between custodial arrests, intended to enable prosecution, and brief 
seizures, which may serve a host of non-prosecutorial purposes.  For 
Sklansky, the fundamental problem with ad hoc instrumentalism is in its 
tension with the rule of law, and in its undermining of accountability.  
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For Miller, the practice of using preventative policing for investigative 
purposes undermines the legitimacy of the police, especially in minority 
communities. All of these concerns are implicated when collateral 
incentives transform arrests into vehicles for the attainment of goals 
other than criminal prosecution.  The kind of pretextual enforcement that 
is facilitated by collateral incentives is in tension with rule-of-law ideals 
insofar as these dictate that state coercion should be exercised against 
individuals in accordance with stable rules and for transparent purposes: 
it licenses, in Sklansky’s words, “a kind of petty tyranny.”340  
Accountability is undermined when the purposes that arrests serve are 
incidentally broadened by laws and regulations not explicitly intended to 
alter the contours of the arrest power by a democratically accountable 
body.  And the pretextual uses of arrests which collateral incentives 
invite will certainly do little to improve the perception of police 
legitimacy in the communities most liable to experience the practical 
consequences of these policies. 
While it is a tall order to ask for a remaking of modern policing so as 
to root out ad hoc instrumentalism or separate the investigative and 
caretaking roles, it may be a slightly less tall one to ask for caution with 
regard to the use of the most coercive tool at police’s disposal.  This is 
especially so if the public policy goals achieved by attaching collateral 
incentives may be substantially furthered otherwise.  State legislatures 
may not be able to explicitly broaden the purposes of arrests to 
encompass the two sets of interests discussed here.  For instance, states 
are constitutionally precluded from authorizing arrests by simply 
criminalizing civil violations of the immigration laws.341  And a law that 
authorizes arrests or detentions only to collect DNA samples in absence 
of individualized suspicion would likely be unconstitutional.  However, 
there are ample and adequate alternate means of advancing the same 
public goals.  Notably, most, if not all, of the advantages of database 
screening regimes may be captured by maintaining screening and 
analysis of fingerprints and DNA at conviction, which ensures that state 
actors are committed to the prosecution of the crime of arrest by the 
screened individuals and lessens the distortion of arrest incentives.  
Indeed, all states have laws that mandate the collection of DNA from 
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those convicted of certain crimes.342  The value-added of screening at 
arrest is to pick those individuals who will not be convicted of the crime 
of arrest, or will be convicted of a lesser crime not qualifying for 
collection, where the crime of arrest does qualify.  This group of 
arrestees appears on their face to be the least valuable, least criminally 
prone, additions to the DNA databanks.343  Similarly, screening 
fingerprints against the DHS database at conviction—or, simply not 
releasing information discovered at arrest to local LEAs until 
conviction—would still substantially advance the goal of identifying 
criminal aliens.  While post-conviction screening may fail to detect a few 
dangerous criminals, who happen to be arrested but not prosecuted, there 
is little evidence that their numbers are significant.344  Even if screening 
at conviction solves fewer cold cases or catches fewer deportable non-
citizens, it should be clear that any incremental value added by on-arrest 
screening is no mere windfall to society that results in the course of 
police activities that would have occurred in any case.  Whatever the 
incremental benefit provided by on-arrest screening, the diversion of 
arrests from their historic, primary purpose is too steep a price to pay for 
it. 
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